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What Should Be Done About Rising Unemployment in the OECD? 
 
There is a growing belief that the recession has run its course and that the goods market has 
started a period of slow, but sustainable, recovery.  Improvement in the labor market may 
take some time, but many believe that unemployment will return to its 2007 level in the 
medium term.  In this paper, we argue that recovery is by no means guaranteed and that the 
consequences for unemployment may be worse than anticipated. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
There is a growing belief that the recession has run its course and that the goods market has 
started a period of slow, but sustainable, recovery.  Improvement in the labor market may 
take some time, but many believe that unemployment will return to its 2007 level in the 
medium term.  In this paper, we argue that recovery is by no means guaranteed and that the 
consequences for unemployment may be worse than anticipated. Further, the human costs of 
the increase in unemployment are being consistently understated. As Stiglitz (2008) puts it, 
the collective failure of governments to adequately control aggregate demand will principally 
be “the human toll -- families whose life dreams are destroyed as they lose their homes, their 
jobs, and their life savings.”
 1   
 
The November 2008 IMF forecast suggested that the global unemployment rate would rise 
from 5.7 per cent in 2007 to 6.1 per cent in 2009, increasing worldwide unemployment by 18 
million. If instead the unemployment rate instead rises to 6.5 per cent during 2009, 
unemployment will increase by 30 million and in the IMF’s worst case scenario, the world 
unemployment rate could rise to 7.1 per cent, increasing the global number of unemployed 
by more than 50 million people. 
 
The costs of unemployment will not be shared evenly. They will vary across countries and 
between groups within populations.  We start the paper by considering the world economic 
outlook, arguing that it is much more fragile than many commentators believe and that return 
to previous levels of unemployment is not guaranteed. We then examine the increases in 
unemployment that have already taken place at a country level, looking at how they relate to 
other economic indicators of the recession. Next we consider the human and social costs of 
increased unemployment, especially among the young, while the next to last section 
discusses some policy issues.  In the final section we draw some conclusions. 
 
2. Outlook for the World Economy 
At the beginning of 2009, the OECD economies experienced the most severe downturn in 
output since the Great Depression. Though the main contributory cause of the downturn lay 
in US credit markets, European economies which had similarly liberal credit environments or 
which were reliant on external demand experienced a substantial fall in demand from early 
2008.  By 2009 every member country of the OECD has experienced increasing 
unemployment rates. 
 
The securitization of US sub-prime mortgages had a contagious effect on world credit 
markets. Many large financial institutions withdrew to their home markets and sought to 
increase their reserves by holding back on lending.  It is clear that the price of risk had been 
too low and was going to have to be re-priced upwards. Almost overnight, credit became 
very scarce.  The financial crisis had a dramatic effect on demand, causing output to decline 
steeply. Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009) show that financial crises have "deep and lasting 
                                                 
1 Stiglitz, J. (2008) “Global Crisis - Made in America” in Spiegel Online International, December 11
th, 
Accessed at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,590028,00.html   
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 effects on asset prices, output and employment".
2  More often than not, they argue, the 
aftermath of severe financial crises share three characteristics. First, asset market collapses 
are deep and prolonged.  Real housing price declines average 35 percent stretched out over 
six years, while equity price collapses average 55 percent over a downturn of about three and 
a half years. Second, the aftermath of banking crises is associated with large declines in 
output and employment. The unemployment rate increases, an average of 7 percentage points 
over the down phase of the cycle, which lasts, on average over four years. Output falls (from 
peak to trough) an average of over 9 percent, although the duration of the downturn, 
averaging roughly two years, is considerably shorter than for unemployment. Third, the real 
value of government debt tends to explode, rising an average of 86 percent in the major post–
World War II episodes. The government budget constraint implies that any short-run fiscal 
expansions must be compensated by future reductions in demand and consequent weakened 
growth. 
 
But the conventional wisdom among macroeconomists was that such a severe recession 
could not occur. Their attention had shifted from demand-side to supply-side causes of 
macroeconomic instability. Thus, as Blanchard (2005) notes, explanations of unemployment 
changed from the effects of shocks in the 1970s, to persistence mechanisms in the 1980s, and 
finally to labor market institutions such as employment protection and unemployment 
insurance in the 1990s.
3 So in most OECD countries, recent policies have focused almost 
exclusively on removing imperfections from the supply side of the economy, particularly the 
labor market. Yet the current recession is driven by a collapse of demand - the result of a 
combination of significant imbalances in demand structures and unsustainable increases in 
credit. The recent dramatic rise in joblessness has little to do with supply-side explanations of 
unemployment such as the prevalence of trade unions, wage flexibility, the generosity of 
unemployment benefits or job protection (See Blanchflower, 2001).
4 
 
There has been a reduction in the rate of decline of output in the last quarter in most 
countries.  Indeed, in France and Germany, output has started to grow.  However, Table 1 
shows that out of the thirty-one countries for which data are available on seasonally adjusted 
volumes of GDP, for all but eight the most recent data show a decline.  The exceptions are 
France (0.3), Germany (0.3%), Greece (0.3), Poland (0.5), Portugal (0.3), Slovenia (0.7%), 
Slovakia (2.2) following a quarterly loss of -11% and Sweden (0%).  More recent data also 
suggest that recovery may have started in Japan. This does not mean that growth may not 
turn negative again – a W-shaped recovery - as the demand-depressing effects of increased 
unemployment start to exert a further negative effect on production and sales.  The 
                                                 
2 C.M. Reinhart and K.S. Rogoff (2009), 'The aftermath of financial crises', NBER Working Paper #14656. 
 
3 Blanchard, O. (2005) 'European Unemployment: The Evolution of Facts and Ideas', National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper 11750 
 
4 Blanchflower, D.G. (2001), "Unemployment, Well-Being and Wage Curves in Eastern and Central Europe", 




 interaction between rising unemployment, falling house prices and negative equity are likely 
to cause further difficulties in those countries where a major cause of the recession has been 
the collapse of credit markets.  Further, it does not mean that the negative effects of this 
recession on the labor market will be over any time soon.   Even if the growth rate turns 
positive it will be some time before the level of output is restored to pre-recession levels.   
 
As the OECD noted in its interim assessment of the economic outlook for OECD countries 
on September 3
rd 2009, there is some evidence of improvement.
5  Corporate bond spreads 
have come down. Fewer banks are tightening credit. Share prices have rebounded. Money 
market stress has eased. Financial conditions have improved. Export orders have firmed. US 
housing construction may be nearing a bottom.  Business confidence has recovered.   
Estimates for third quarter 2009 GDP have been revised up.  However, CDS spreads for 
banks remain elevated. Consumer confidence remains at very low levels and unemployment 
continues to rise and employment to fall.  
 
The recent evidence from the Baltic Dry index is also of particular concern (Figure 1). The 
Baltic Dry Index is a daily average of prices to ship raw materials. It represents the cost paid 
by an end customer to have a shipping company transport raw materials across seas on the 
Baltic Exchange, the global marketplace for brokering shipping contracts. The index is 
quoted every working day at 1300 London time. The Baltic is owned and operated by the 
member buyers and sellers.  The BDI measures the demand to move raw materials and 
precursors to production, as well as the supply of ships available to move this cargo. "The 
BDI offers a real time glimpse at global raw material and infrastructure demand. Unlike 
stock and commodities markets, the Baltic Dry Index is totally devoid of speculative players. 
The trading is limited only to the member companies, and the only relevant parties securing 
contracts are those who have actual cargo to move and those who have the ships to move it".
6 
 
The index moved from approximately its long run average of around 1700 to 11700 in early 
May 2008 before collapsing to 1463 in early September 2008.  It recovered to 4291 in June 
2009.  Since then it has lost 45% of its value.  On September 4
th 2009 it stood at 2414.  
World demand looks to be falling back again. 
 
It remains uncertain to this point whether the recovery, when it comes will be V-shaped or 
W-shaped or some other letter.  The concern is that banks are not lending and much of the 
positive evidence we have seen is driven by government fiscal and monetary interventions.  
Countries such as the USA have injected huge fiscal stimuli. The European economies have 
largely followed suit, including France and Germany.  There have been 'cash for clunkers 
programs, temporary cuts in VAT and subsidies to labour costs that look to have been 
successful.  Monetary policy has also been extremely loose.  Interest rates in the Euro area 
and in the UK and the US are close to the zero bound and even negative in the case of 
Sweden.  Attempts to increase the money supply through quantitative easing continue apace.  
                                                 
5 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/32/43615812.pdf  
 
6 http://www.wikinvest.com/index/Baltic_Dry_Index_-_BDI_%28BALDRY%29  
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 The worry is that once this public stimulus is withdrawn, the private sector is in no position 




'The duration of the slump may be much more prolonged than most people 
are expecting and … much will be changed both in our ideas and in our 
methods before we emerge. Not, of course the duration of the acute phase 
of the slump, but that of the long, dragging conditions of semi-slump, or at 
least sub-normal prosperity, which may be expected to succeed the acute 
phase."   
 
Nouriel Roubini, writing in the Financial Times on August 23
rd 2009 argued the risk of a 
'double dip' recession is rising. Roubini called the recession earlier than most.  There are 
several arguments he gives for a weak recovery which we need to take seriously. First, 
employment is still falling sharply in the US.  Second, this is a crisis of solvency, not just 
liquidity, but true de-leveraging has not begun yet because the losses of financial institutions 
have been socialized and put on government balance sheets. This, he argues, limits the ability 
of banks to lend, households to spend and companies to invest. Third, in countries running 
current account deficits, consumers need to cut spending and save much more, yet debt-
burdened consumers face a wealth shock from falling home prices and stock markets and 
shrinking incomes and employment. Fourth, the financial system - despite the policy support 
- is still severely damaged. Most of the shadow banking system has disappeared, and 
traditional banks are saddled with trillions of dollars in expected losses on loans and 
securities while still being seriously under-capitalized.  The globalization of the capital 
market has been abruptly halted, with many banks retreating from foreign markets. Fifth, 
weak profitability - owing to high debts and default risks, low growth and persistent 
deflationary pressures on corporate margins - will constrain companies' willingness to 
produce, hire workers and invest. Sixth, the re-leveraging of the public sector through its 
build-up of large fiscal deficits risks crowding out a recovery in private sector spending. 
Moreover, Roubini argues that the effects of the policy stimulus "will fizzle out by early next 
year", requiring greater private demand to support continued growth. Seventh, the reduction 
of global imbalances implies that the current account deficits of profligate economies, such 
as the US, will narrow the surpluses of countries that over-save (China and other emerging 
markets, Germany and Japan).   
 
The recovery is certainly not over and is threatened by countries removing the various stimuli 
too quickly.  This was exactly the point made by Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund, at the Sixth Annual Bundesbank Lecture in 
Berlin on September 4, 2009.
8 
                                                 
7 'An economic analysis of unemployment' by J.M. Keynes in 'Unemployment as a world-problem' By Quincy 





8 http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/090409.htm  
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 "I expect this recovery to be relatively sluggish. In the advanced 
economies, it is still largely driven by policy stimulus and restocking, with 
underlying private demand remaining weak. The outlook for the emerging 
economies is considerably better, though the pace of recovery in advanced 
trading partners remains a risk. 
Given the fragility of the recovery, there are risks that it could stall—
though thankfully these risks appear to be receding. Premature exit from 
accommodative monetary and fiscal policies is a principal concern. In 
addition, problems in the financial sector could persist or even intensify 
further, particularly if efforts to restore banks to health are not completed." 
This looks right. And the inevitable consequence of a weak recovery is to delay further any 
sign of light in the labor market. In the next section, we look at the symptoms of the 
recession that are contributing to weakness in the labor market. 
 
3. Symptoms of Recession 
 
1) Output 
The first lesson of labor economics is that labor is a derived demand, so it makes sense to 
begin by considering what has happened to output in recent quarters. Output has already 
fallen in many developed and less-developed countries. The extent of the decline in the G7 
output is evident from Figure 2. It plots the deviation of G7 output from trend for the period 
1961 to 2009 quarter 1.
9 By 2009Q1, output had fallen to almost 6% below trend, having 
ended 2007 nearly 2% above trend. This deviation is substantially in excess of any recession 
in the last 50 years, leading to a concern that this recession will be deeper and longer lasting 
than previous downturns.  The extent of the monetary contraction is historically large as is 
the scale of the fiscal and monetary responses.  
 
But within this overall fall in OECD output, there is huge variation among countries, as again 
evidenced from Table 1.  Table 2 gives the turning points of recession based on output. The 
variation between countries reflects differential levels of financial stress, differences in 
exposure to international trade, and variations in fiscal and monetary responses to the 
downturn.  The fall in world trade has been much more rapid than that of world output.   
Hence, countries such as Germany and Japan, where external demand forms a large 
proportion of total demand, have experienced a more rapid decline in output than countries 
less dependent on trade. Trade in manufactures has fallen more rapidly than trade in services, 
perhaps because it is possible to trade from inventories with manufactures, but not with 
services. 
 
One issue is when recession actually began around the OECD.  There are two main places to 
look.  First, using changes in GDP and/or secondly to the labor market.  It is often asserted 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
9 Data is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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 that the labor market is a lagging indicator, but not this time in most countries.  The NBER 
dating committee dated the start of the recession in the United States as being in December 
2007.  Their call was based on the change in the labor market, and principally on 
employment.  In fact the unemployment rate started rising from around March 2007.   
Interestingly, output didn't start to fall until 2008Q2 in the United States.  Of particular 
concern is that data revisions so far over the past year have suggested that the recession 
started earlier than first thought, for example in the UK, as revisions have been downward, in 
part due to the difficulties of seasonal adjustment. 
 
Figure 3 shows more recent observations on some of the US data which the NBER used to 
time the beginning of the recession. The recent local minimum or maximum is indicated by a 
vertical red line. Data on house prices, unemployment, employment and real GDP are 
illustrated. Again, note that seasonal adjustment always introduces some noise into a data 
series, which may influence perceptions of turning points. However, Figure 3 does show an 
interesting set of correlations between data series, which may not be entirely causal, but 
which are certainly not coincidental.  
 
House prices began to fall in 2006Q2, while unemployment started to rise in 2007. Two 
possible causal explanations are the negative wealth effects of declining house values on 
consumer demand and the reduction in activity in the construction sector. However, it 
appears that employment started to fall some time after unemployment began to increase. 
This may reflect supply characteristics.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates the timing of the recession in Germany. It includes the same set of panels, 
other than house prices. The housing market is not implicated as a cause of the current 
difficulties in the German economy. The timing of the response to falling demand is more 
conventional in Germany than in the USA. Output starts to fall precipitously in 2008 Q1. The 
decline in employment begins two quarters later and unemployment starts to rise after a 
further quarter’s delay. This is a textbook response to a fall in demand, where firms initially 
try to hoard labor, particularly skilled labor, before initiating layoffs. However, the increase 
in unemployment in Germany is much smaller than that in the USA.  This is not wholly 
explained by its later entry to recession. It also reflects different policy responses. Wage 
subsidies have been introduced in Germany, France, Italy and Spain to slow the increase in 
unemployment. The UK and USA have resisted such measures, partly because their social 
insurance schemes are much less generous than those in continental Europe, and therefore the 
net cost of such schemes would be much higher in the USA and UK. 
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide similar information on timing of the recession for France and 
the UK. Germany and France have experienced similarly modest reductions in employment. 
But output and unemployment in the two countries have behaved quite differently. Germany 
has experienced a much more significant fall in output, perhaps reflecting its greater 
dependence on exports as a source of demand. But unemployment has grown much more 
rapidly in France, which is surprising, given the similarity of the decline in employment in 
the two countries. This may stem from differences in the supply-side of the respective labor 
markets and from differences in policy responses to the recession. 
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 The pattern of events in the UK is much closer to the USA than either France of Germany. 
As with the USA, there was a very significant house price bubble in the UK prior to the 
recession. This came to an end in 2007 Q4, more than a year after the downturn in US house 
prices. Unemployment started to rise, and employment and output began to fall around 2007 
Q4 and 2008 Q1. As in the USA, the rise in unemployment in the UK quickly exceeded the 
levels experienced during this decade, and now stands at its highest level since 1996. Thus 
far, unemployment in France and Germany remains below its previous peak in this decade. 
 
2) House Price Inflation 
Table 3 shows annual levels of house price inflation to the first quarter of 2009. It 
demonstrates how deep has been the fall in the price of housing in some countries. It shows 
that house-owners in the UK and USA have been among the hardest hit by the fall in value of 
what is likely to be their largest single asset. The Baltic Republics, with the exception of 
Lithuania, Poland, along with Ireland and Denmark have also experienced significant drops 
in value. On the other hand, there has been modest growth in values in some countries, such 
as Israel, the Czech Republic and Switzerland. 
 
Changes in asset values will influence real behavior, as mentioned previously. Reductions in 
the value of housing will have wealth effects on consumers and will affect the construction 
sector. In addition, turnover is likely to fall if sellers price expectations are unrealistically 
high. This may impede efficiency as workers find it more difficult to migrate to take up new 
employment opportunities.  
 
3) The Labor Market 
Tables 4 and 5 contain information on the labor market response to the fall in demand.  Table 
4 shows the falls in employment and turning points.  Countries are ranked by the percentage 
decline in employment from the peak.  Up to the first half of 2009, Ireland, Spain and the 
United States experienced the greatest declines.  As noted earlier the US went into recession 
on this measure in 2007 Q4, while Hungary entered even earlier in 2007 Q2.  Most other 
countries entered recession in 2008 Q2.  This includes the UK, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and 
Turkey.  France, Germany, Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Greece, Norway didn’t see 
declining job numbers until the final quarter of 2008.  By 2009Q1 all of the countries had 
declining employment.   
 
The final column reports the relationship between the decline in employment and its scale 
compared with the size of the increase in unemployment since the peak.  For example, in the 
United States employment has fallen by 5,684,000 but unemployment has risen by 7,567,000 
so the ratio in the final column is 75.1%.  In part this is why youth unemployment has risen 
so fast, firms have simply stopped hiring. We return to this issue below. 
 
Table 5 contains similar information on unemployment. The most recent monthly 
unemployment rates for each OECD country are presented in Appendix Table 1 from 
January 2008-July 2009.  It can be see from Table 5 that the turning point when 
unemployment started to rise is somewhat earlier than when employment started to fall.  This 
occurred in 2007 in Spain, Ireland, the United States, Luxembourg, Japan and Italy.   
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 Unemployment rates started to rise in the G7 and the OECD in June 2007.  In all of these 
countries unemployment was rising by the beginning of 2009. 
 
Table 6 brings together information from the goods market and the labor market.  It shows 
the extent of the deterioration in employment and output since their most recent turning 
points for a range of countries.  Countries are listed according to the fall in employment and 
output that they have experienced: less than 2 per cent; between 2 per cent and 4 per cent; 
and more than 4 per cent.  The Baltic States and Ireland have experienced the most dramatic 
fall in demand, perhaps because their financial institutions were particularly exposed to the 
wholesale credit market. They have either not been able, or not been willing, to cushion the 
effects of the fall in demand on their respective labor markets and thus have experienced very 
large declines in employment. Spain has also experienced a very substantial fall in 
employment, though apparently without such a dramatic fall in employment. This may have 
arisen because demand falls have been concentrated in low productivity industries. It may 
also have been relatively easy for employers to reduce the size of their workforce, given that 
many workers in these industries are on temporary contracts and Spain has the highest 
concentration of workers on temporary contracts in Europe, at around 24 per cent of the 
workforce. 
 
Some countries have largely been unaffected by the recession, because other factors offset 
the negative effects from demand. Thus countries like Norway and Australia may benefit 
from their production of natural resources where demand is relatively inelastic, while the 
Polish economy is benefiting from a reallocation of demand within Europe due to its 
relatively low costs.  However, large numbers of migrant workers who worked in the UK and 
Ireland in particular have now returned, presumably to unemployment.  As the remittances 
they sent home have presumably fallen considerably and which boosted the Polish economy 
in the past, this does not augur well for Poland in the next few years.  Similar but smaller 
effects are likely to also be seen in Lithuania and Latvia where even higher proportions of the 
workforce went abroad, principally to the UK and Ireland, in search of work from 2004 when 
the A8 Accession countries joined the EU.  The Dutch have had a relatively large drop in 
output of nearly five percentage points without much commensurate change to this point in 
either employment or unemployment. More recent evidence does suggest a considerable 
deterioration in the Dutch labour market. 
 
The remaining countries have experienced larger falls in output than in employment: a 
mixture of labour hoarding by employers and the effects of policy measures taken by 
governments. Both of these effects may be time limited: employers may become unable to 
afford to hold on to staff unless there is a significant upturn in demand and governments may 
withdraw subsidies to employment due to worries about their fiscal stance. 
 
Who has been impacted the most, by the rising levels of unemployment?  The answer is the 
young, in every country.  Table 7 shows the rise in youth unemployment rates from July 2008 
to July 2009.  Currently youth unemployment rates for the under 25s in the Eu27 are 19.7% 
and 17.8% in the United States.  They are especially high in Spain (38.4%). They are 
everywhere higher than adult rates.  The next to last column gives the overall rate and the 
final column the ratio of youth: overall rates.  Rates are two and a half times that of overall 
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 rates or more in Belgium, Finland, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Table 8 provides some of the reason for this.  The youth cohort is especially large at a time 
when the labor market is in the doldrums.  The table sets out the size of four single age 
cohorts in comparison to the size of the cohort of twenty year olds, which is set to 100.  In 
some countries the number of twenty five year olds is a maximum, some it is other ages but 
this is done for simplicity.  What we find is that a) in some Western countries the number of 
twenty year olds is greater than the number of twenty five year olds.  Examples are the UK, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and Denmark that have very high youth unemployment rates.  
b) The big exceptions to that are in Eastern Europe (Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia and the Ukraine) that are well known to have 
declining birth rates and hence aging populations.  c) However, very quickly the size of the 
youth cohort will collapse, especially in Eastern Europe.  In five years time the number of 
twenty year olds, based on how many fifteen year olds there are now, declines rapidly, and 
even more so in ten and fifteen years time.  The decline in the size of the cohort, in ten years 
time say, is smaller in the US than in other countries, in part because of the larger role of 
immigration.  Immigrants tend to be young.  In ten years time in the Euro area the number of 
twenty year olds will have dropped by twelve percent.  In ten years time the size of the youth 
cohort is going to be smaller in all countries except Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway.   
 
There is also some evidence from around the world, that the least educated, as well as those 
with the lowest skill levels, plus minorities and immigrants are especially impacted by the 
drop in demand.  In the US for example, in August 2009, black unemployment rates stand at 
15.1% and Hispanics at 13.0% compared with 8.9% for whites.
10  Unemployment rates for 
high school dropouts were 15.6% compared with 9.7% for high school graduates, 8.2% for 
those with some college and 4.7% for those with a college degree and higher.   
 
In the UK unemployment rates are much higher for the least skilled occupations.  According 
to weighted data from the recently available UK 2009Q2 Labour Force Survey, 
unemployment rates by highest qualification were as follows. 
 
Degree or equivalent     3.7% 
  Higher degree    2.7% 
  First degree    3.8% 
  Other degree    3.3% 
Higher education      4.2% 
GCE A level or equivalent     7.3% 
GCSE grades A-C or equivalent   9.6% 
Other qualifications      10.7% 
No qualifications     14.4% 
                                                 




 Unemployment rates, which average 7.7%, by racial group were whites 7.1%, mixed race 
17.2%; Asians 11.8%, blacks 17.3% and Chinese 4.2%.  The unemployment rate of those 
whose country of origin was outside the UK was 9.3%.  The distribution of UK occupations 
based on last occupation, is presented below in the first column for the unemployed along 
with the distribution of those currently employed in the second column.  So 25.7% of the 
unemployed were employed in elementary occupations in their last job before they became 
unemployed, compared with 11.3% of the currently employed. 
            Unemployed       Employed 
Managers and senior officials   8.2     15.6  
Professional occupations   5.0     13.6  
Associate professional and technical           8.8         14.7  
Administrative and secretarial         9.1     11.4  
Skilled trades occupations      14.5   10.6  
Personal service occupations        5.4     8.7  
Sales and customer service occupation          11.5          7.3  
Process, plant and machine operatives          11.9         6.9  
Elementary occupations   25.7      11.3  
Note that the unemployed were more likely to be from elementary and skilled trade 
occupations and less likely to be from managerial or professional occupations. 
According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey of individuals available #70.1 which 
surveyed respondents in the EU27 between October and November 2008, the weighted EU27 
average unemployment rates by education attainment suggested unemployment rates of 4.7% 
for individuals who left school at age 20 or higher and 9.0% for those who left school at a 
younger age.
11  Unemployment rates were 7.6% for the indigenous populations and 11.1% 
for immigrants.  
Table 9 provides evidence of unemployment rates by qualification across OECD countries.  
It is quite clear that for all age groups and countries, unemployment rates are higher for the 
least educated. 
 
4.  Attitudes to Unemployment 
It is of interest to examine the attitudes of both individuals and firms at this stage in the 
cycle, not least because consumer and business confidence fell very early as countries moved 
into recession.  In the USA consumer confidence started to fall around the middle of 2007, 
for example on the Conference Board balances presented below.  It has recovered a little 
since the beginning of 2009 but remains at a low level. 
 
Jan-07  110.2 Jan-08  87.3 Jan-09  37.4 
Feb-07  111.2 Feb-08  76.4 Feb-09  25.3 
Mar-07  108.2 Mar-08  65.9 Mar-09  26.9 
                                                 
11 Data are available on approximately 25,000 individuals in the workforce. 
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 Apr-07  106.3 Apr-08  62.8 Apr-09  40.8 
May-07  108.5 May-08  58.1 May-09  54.8 
Jun-07  105.3 Jun-08  51.0 Jun-09  49.3 
Jul-07  111.9 Jul-08  51.9 Jul-09  47.4 
Aug-07  105.6 Aug-08  58.5 Aug-09  54.1 
Sep-07 99.5  Sep-08 61.4   
Oct-07 95.2  Oct-08 38.8   
Nov-07 87.8  Nov-08 44.7   
Dec-07  90.6 Dec-08  38.6   
  
Consumer confidence in Europe also fell from the middle of 2007, predating the increase in 
the unemployment rate.  Below we present data on the overall confidence indicator balances 
taken from the EU consumer confidence surveys.  They also started to improve in 2009 even 
though the EU entered the recession several months after the US.  However, it should be said 
that consumer confidence is still at low levels compared with the overall series average since 
January 1985 of minus 11. 
 
Jan-07  -6 Jan-08  -10 Jan-09  -31 
Feb-07  -5 Feb-08  -11 Feb-09  -32 
Mar-07  -4 Mar-08  -11 Mar-09  -32 
Apr-07  -4 Apr-08  -12 Apr-09  -28 
May-07  -1 May-08  -13 May-09  -26 
Jun-07  -1 Jun-08  -16 Jun-09  -23 
Jul-07  -1 Jul-08  -20 Jul-09  -21 
Aug-07  -3 Aug-08  -19 Aug-09  -20 
Sep-07  -5 Sep-08  -19  
Oct-07  -5 Oct-08  -24  
Nov-07  -7 Nov-08  -26  
Dec-07  -8 Dec-08  -29  
  
Tables 10 and 11 provide some evidence on people's views on changes they expect in the 
labor market.  Table 10 is restricted to the United States.  Part a) uses data from the 
University of Michigan surveys of Consumer Confidence.  Here we report evidence on 
people's views on whether unemployment over the next twelve months will 'be more than 
now, the same or less'.  Two main facts stand out.  The fear of unemployment – measured by 
the proportion saying they expected it to rise, began to pick up from November 2007 just 
around the time the NBER dated the recession.  It rose to 64%, fell a little a year ago but was 
at 66% in January 2009, the latest date we have data for.  The story is broadly similar if we 
examine the proportion that say it would be less, until January 2009 when the proportion rose 
to 12%. 
Part b) of Table 10 provides comparable, and more timely, data for the United States from 
the Conference Board from January 2007 through August 2009.  The series is available back 
to January 1978.  Respondents were asked are jobs plentiful currently – responses are coded 
as plentiful, not so plentiful or hard to find.  We also report the monthly US unemployment 
rate.  As with the University of Michigan survey, the labor market appeared to start to 
11 
 slacken on these data ate the end of 2007.  This is true whether we base it on the proportion 
of respondents in the 'plentiful' or 'hard to find' categories.  The series has remained broadly 
stable as unemployment continued to increase during 2009.   
US respondents seem to understand that unemployment is not going to improve much any 
time soon.  Unfortunately respondents in Europe have a different view.  They are much more 
optimistic that things are going to get much better when the evidence is to the contrary.  This 
may well be a problem.  
 
Responses are available in each member country of the EU each month to a very similar 
question to that asked in the Michigan survey.  “How do you expect the number of people 
unemployed in the country to change over the next 12 months?"  Answers are provided in 
five categories ranging from 'increase sharply' to 'decrease sharply.  The series for the EU as 
a whole is reported in Figure 7 since its inception in 1985 as a survey balance.  The series 
jumped sharply in mid-2007 well before unemployment started to rise, so people understood 
what was coming before the data showed it.  We take the view there is something in these 
fear of unemployment series (Blanchflower, 1994, and Blanchflower and Shadforth, 2009).
12  
The fear of unemployment has helped to contain wage pressure. 
 
However, just as unemployment started to rise rapidly from the beginning of 2009 (Appendix 
Table 1) in all countries, inexplicably, the fear of unemployment series improved.  People 
appear to believe unemployment is going to improve.  Why remains unclear.  Respondents 
appear to believe the talk of green shoots.  There is very little likelihood of that being the 
case according to most forecasts, including those of the OECD.  Table 11 provides individual 
balances by country as well as how the balances are calculated. This phenomenon of a 
declining fear of unemployment, which is not present apparently in the USA, seems to be 
true in most countries except Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.  This is likely to be a particular 
concern for policy makers if unemployment is rising and people don't expect that is going to 
be the case, especially as it interacts with falling house prices and negative equity.  The fear 
of unemployment, it should be said, is still high historically across all countries. 
 
Interestingly, despite the improvement in the fear of unemployment series in Europe by 
individuals there is less evidence that businesses have the same view.  The EU also conducts 
a series of business monitors where it asks business owners for their views on a number of 
issues including how employment will change over the next three months.
13  S e p a r a t e  
surveys are conducted in construction, industry, retail and services.  The survey balances for 
the EU27 are presented below.  
                                                
 
 
12 Blanchflower, D.G. (1991). 'Fear, unemployment and pay flexibility', Economic Journal, March, pp. 483– 
496.  Blanchflower, D.G. and C. Shadforth (2009), "Fear, Unemployment and Migration", Economic Journal, 
119(535), February, pp. F136-F182. 
 
13 Respondents were asked ‘how do you expect your firm’s total employment to change over the next 3 months? 
It will...+ increase; = remain unchanged − decrease’. 
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                   Building      Industry        Retail     Services 
Jan-08 4  -2  5  10 
Feb-08 0  -3 5 8 
Mar-08 -1 -3  4 10 
Apr-08  -4  -4 3 6 
May-08  -4  -6 1 8 
Jun-08  -5 -8 -1  4 
Jul-08 -9  -11  -3 4 
Aug-08 -10 -11  -3  5 
Sep-08 -13 -13  -4  3 
Oct-08  -18  -19 -3 -1 
Nov-08  -20  -24 -5 -5 
Dec-08 -24 -31 -14  -9 
Jan-09  -31 -34 -18 -16 
Feb-09 -32 -37 -16 -18 
Mar-09 -31 -41 -16 -21 
Apr-09 -30 -39 -16 -22 
May-09 -28 -38 -13 -22 
Jun-09  -27 -36 -15 -22 
Jul-09  -27 -33 -13 -23 
Aug-09 -25 -31 -13 -17 
 
All of the surveys declined steadily from early 2008.  There is little evidence of improved 
sentiment in any sector by businesses in 2009. 
 
5. The Consequences of Unemployment 




1) Because of the lost output involved.  During a long period of unemployment, workers can 
lose their skills, causing a loss of human capital.  
 
2) Unemployment is a stressful life event that makes people unhappy.
15   
 
3) Unemployment increases susceptibility to malnutrition, illness, mental stress, and loss of 
self-esteem, leading to depression.
16   Goldsmith, Veum and Darity (1996, 1997) found, for 
                                                 
14 D.N.F. Bell and D.G. Blanchflower (2009), 'What should be done about rising unemployment in the UK? 
Scotecon Working Paper available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~blnchflr/papers/speech379paper.pdf 
 
15 L. Winkelmann and R. Winkelmann (1998), 'Why are the unemployed so unhappy?  Evidence from panel 
data', Economica, 65(257), pp. 1-15.  A.E. Clark and A.J. Oswald (1994), 'Unhappiness and unemployment', 
Economic Journal, 104(424), pp. 648-659.  B.S. Frey and A. Stutzer (2002), Happiness and Economics, 
Princeton University Press.  Ahn, N., J.R. García and J.F. Jimeno (2004), 'The impact of unemployment on 
individual well-being in the EU', European Network of Economic Policy Institutes, Working Paper No 29. 
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 example, using data from the NLSY that being jobless injures self-esteem and fosters 
feelings of externality and helplessness among youths.  Moreover, they also found evidence 
that the psychological imprint of joblessness persists. 
 
4) Increases in the unemployment rate tend to be associated with increases in the suicide 
rate.
17  The unemployed appear to have a higher propensity to commit suicide.  
 
5) Being unemployed can also reduce the life expectancy of workers.
18   
 
6) Unemployment increases the probability of poor physical health outcomes such as heart 
attacks in later life.
19 
                                                                                                                                                       
16 M. Linn, R. Sandifer and S. Stein (1985),  'Effects of unemployment on mental and physical health', 
American Journal of Public Health,  75, pp. 502-506.  M. Frese and G. Mohr (1987), 'Prolonged unemployment 
and depression in older workers: a longitudinal study of intervening variables, Social Science and Medicine, 25, 
pp. 173-178. P. Jackson and P. Warr (1987), 'Mental health of unemployed men in different parts of England 
and Wales', British Medical Journal, 295, p. 525. M.H. Banks and P.R. Jackson (1982), 'Unemployment and the 
risk of minor psychiatric disorder in young people: cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence', Psychological 
Medicine, 12, pp. 789-798.  Darity, W.R. Jr. and A.H. Goldsmith (1996), 'Social psychology, unemployment 
and macroeconomics', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), Winer, pp. 121-140.  A.H. Goldsmith, J.R. 
Veum and W. Darity (1996),  'The psychological impact of unemployment and joblessness', Journal of Socio-
Economics, 25(3), April, pp. 333-358.  A.H. Goldsmith, J.R. Veum and W. Darity (1997), 'Unemployment, 
joblessness, psychological well-being and self-esteem: theory and evidence', Journal of Socio-Economics, 
26(2), April, pp. 133-158. M.H. Brenner and A. Mooney (1983), Unemployment and health in the context of 
economic change', Social Science and Medicine, 17(16), pp. 1125-1138. 
 
17 S. Platt (1984), 'Unemployment and suicidal behaviour: a review of the literature', Social Science and 
Medicine, 19(2), pp. 93-115. C. Pritchard (1992), ' Is there a link between suicide in young men and 
unemployment? A comparison of the UK with other European Community Countries?', The British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 160, pp. 750-756.  T.A. Blakely, S.C.D. Collings, J. Atkinson (2003), 'Unemployment and suicide. 
Evidence for a causal association?', Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 57, pp. 594-600.  D.S. 
Hamermesh and N.M. Soss. 'An economic theory of suicide', Journal of Political Economy, January/February 
1974, 82(1), pp. 83-98.  D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (2000), 'The Declining Economic Status of 
Young Workers in OECD Countries,' in D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (editors),   Youth Employment 
and Joblessness in Advanced Countries, University of Chicago Press and NBER.   M.C. Daly, D.J. Wilson and 
N.J. Johnson (2008), ' Relative status and well-being: evidence from U.S. suicide deaths', Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco Working Paper 2007-12. 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2007/wp07-12bk.pdf 
 
18  Brenner and Mooney (1984) ibid,  K.A. Moser, P.O. Goldblatt, A.J. Fox and D.R. Jones (1987), 
'Unemployment and mortality: comparison of the 1971 and 1981 longitudinal study census samples', British 
Medical Journal; 1, pp.86-90.  K.A. Moser, P.O. Goldblatt, A.J. Fox and D.R. Jones (1990), 'Unemployment 
and mortality' in: Goldblatt P., editor. Longitudinal study: mortality and social organisation. London: OPCS, 
1990. (Series LS No. 6.) 
 
19  N. Beale and S. Nethercott (1987), 'The health of industrial employees four years after compulsory 
redundancy', Journal of the Royal College of  General  Practitioners, 37 pp. 390-394. L. Iverson and S. Sabroe 
(1988), 'Participation in a follow-up study of health among unemployed and employed people after a company 
closedown: drop outs and selection bias,' Journal of  Epidemiology and Community Health,  42: 396-401. I. 
Mattiasson, F. Lindgarde, J.A. Nilsson and T. Theorell (1990), 'Threats of unemployment and cardiovascular 
risk factors: longitudinal study of quality of sleep and serum cholesterol concentrations in men threatened with 




7) The long-term unemployed are at a particular disadvantage trying to find work.
20  The 
effects of unemployment appear to depend a lot on how long the person has been 
unemployed for.  People's morale sinks as the duration of unemployment rises.  Long-term 
unemployment is especially harmful.  "The long-term unemployed have largely given up 
hope," (Layard, 1986, p.96).
21 
 
8) Unemployment while young, especially of long duration, causes permanent scars rather 
than temporary blemishes.
22  For the young a spell of unemployment does not end with that 
spell; it raises the probability of being unemployed in later years and has a wage penalty.  
These effects are much larger than for older people. 
 
9) As unemployment rates increase, crime rates tend to rise, especially property crime.
23    
  
10) Increases in the unemployment rate, lowers the happiness of everyone, not just the 




The orthodox explanation of unemployment that argues that institutions matter has been 
subject to fairly extensive econometric testing, and in recent years, the validity of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
20 S. Machin and A. Manning (1999), 'The causes and consequences of long-term unemployment in Europe', in 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3C, edited by O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card, North Holland 
 
21 R. Layard (1986), How to beat unemployment, Oxford University Press. 
 
22 David Ellwood (1982), 'Teenage Unemployment: Permanent Scars or Temporary Blemishes?' in The Youth 
Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes and Consequences, edited by Richard B. Freeman and David A. 
Wise, pp. 349-390. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 
 
23 T. Thornberry and R. Christensen (1984), 'Unemployment and criminal involvement.  An investigation of 
reciprocal causal structures', American Sociological Review, 56, pp. 609-627.   M. Lin (2008), 'Does 
unemployment increase crime?  Evidence from US data, 1974-2000', Journal of Human Resources, 43(2), 
Spring, pp. 413-436. S. Raphael and R. Winter-Ebmer (2001), 'Identifying the effect of unemployment on 
crime', Journal of Law and Economics, 44(1), pp. 259-283.   D. Fougere, F. Kramarz and J. Pouget (2006) 
'Youth unemployment and crime in France', CEPR Discussion paper # 5600.  For a discussion of the 
relationship between unemployment and crime see R.B. Freeman (1999), 'The economics of crime', in 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3C, edited by O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card, North Holland.   
 
24 Di Tella R., MacCulloch R.J. and A.J. Oswald (2001), 'Preferences over inflation and unemployment: 
evidence from surveys of happiness', American Economic Review, 91, pp. 335-341. Di Tella R., MacCulloch 
R.J. and A.J. Oswald (2003),  'The macroeconomics of happiness', Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 
809-827.  D. G. Blanchflower (2007), 'Is unemployment more costly than inflation?', NBER Working Paper 
W13505, October. D.G. Blanchflower, David (1991), 'Fear, unemployment and pay flexibility', Economic 
Journal, 101, pp. 483-496. A. Knabe and S. Rätzel (2008), 'Scarring or scaring? The psychological impact of 
past and future unemployment', Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg, February 21. 
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 empirical results supporting this view has been called into question.
 25  It has proved difficult 
to estimate a set of cross-country panel unemployment regressions that contain a lagged 
unemployment rate and a full set of year and country dummies and show that any of the labor 
market rigidity variables work.  This is a crucial test.   
 
This is the first main similarity between European labor markets: labor market institutions do 
not tend to cause unemployment. The major exception is changes in the replacement rate, 
which, in some specifications, do appear to be negatively correlated with changes in the 
unemployment rate.  Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have argued that “the interaction of 
shocks and institutions does a good statistical job of fitting the evolution of unemployment 
both over time and across countries.” This result is questionable because it is obtained in an 
over-fitted model — few data points and lots of variables —and the results appear to be 
driven by the cross-section variation rather than by any time series changes.
26  There are only 
eight time series data points as they use five-year averages from 1960-1995.  Unfortunately 
this explanation does a terrible job of explaining the growth in unemployment across 
countries in the current crisis. 
 
In a recent article, Howell et al (2007) econometrically examined the impact of these rigidity 
variables, or what they call Protective Labor Market Institutions (PLMIs), and concluded 
that: “while significant impacts for employment protection, benefit generosity, and union 
strength have been reported, the clear conclusion from our review of these studies is that the 
effects for the PLMIs is distinctly unrobust, with widely divergent coefficients and levels of 
significance.” Indeed, in his published comments on the Howell et al. article, Jim Heckman 
(2007) argues that the authors “…are convincing in showing the fragility of the evidence on 
the role of labor market institutions in explaining the pattern of European unemployment, 
using standard econometric methodology.” Freeman (2007) also finds the evidence for the 
impact of these institutional variables less than convincing “despite considerable effort, 
researchers have not pinned down the effects, if any, of institutions on other aggregate 
economic outcomes, such as unemployment and employment”.
27  In a recent article, Horst 
                                                 
25  R. Layard, S.N. Nickell and R. Jackman (2005), Unemployment, macroeconomic performance and the 
labour market, Oxford University Press, 2
nd edition.  S.N. Nickell (2006), 'A picture of European 
unemployment: success and failure', in Structural unemployment in Western Europe, edited by M. Werding, 
CESifo Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
26 Blanchard, O., and Wolfers, J. (2000), 'The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European 
unemployment: The aggregate evidence', Economic Journal, 110 (462), pp. 1–33. 
 
27 D. Howell, D. Baker, A. Glyn and J. Schmitt (2007), 'Are protective labour market institutions at the root of 
unemployment? A critical review of the evidence', Capitalism and Society, 2(1), pp. 171. Heckman, J. (2007), 
'Comments on 'Are protective labour market institutions at the root of unemployment? A critical review of the 
evidence by David Howell, Dean Baker, Andrew Glyn and John Schmitt', Capitalism and Society, 2(1), Article 
5, pp. 15.   R.B. Freeman (2007), 'Labor market institutions around the world', NBER WP#13242. 
Blanchflower, D.G. (2001), 'Unemployment, wellbeing and wage curves in Eastern and Central Europe', Journal 
of the Japanese and International Economies, 15(4), pp. 364-402. 
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 Feldmann examined how  the quality of industrial relations affects unemployment in 
developing countries and found relatively moderate effects, especially for females.
28 
 
Countries that have had big increases in unemployment have been either exposed to world 
trade (Germany, Japan and Sweden) or had large increases in house prices (Spain, Ireland 
and the UK) or had large financial sectors (UK and the USA).  The explanations for 
unemployment rest in capital, product and housing markets and not in labor markets.   
Countries with low unionization rates such as the United States and Korea as well as ones 
with high rates such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway have also done badly. 
 
6. Youth Unemployment 
There is a considerable body of evidence suggesting that the young, the least educated and 
especially minorities are hardest in a recession.
29 Youth unemployment rates continue to be 
more sensitive to business-cycle conditions than the adult unemployment rate, as many 
studies have shown (OECD, 2008).
30  Young unskilled men from minority groups are thus 
particularly hard hit.  This is true around the world.  
 
Clark and Summers (1982), in their classic study of the dynamics of youth joblessness argue 
that the problem of teenage unemployment arises from a shortage of jobs. "Aggregate 
demand has a potent impact on the job prospects and market experience of teenagers" (1982, 
p.230).
31  Freeman and Wise (1982), for example, found in their study of youth joblessness 
in the 1970s that it was concentrated, by and large, among a small group who lacked work 
for extended periods of time.
32 Over half of the male teenage unemployment they examined 
was among those who were out of work for over six months, a group constituting less than 
10% of the youth labor force and only 7% of the youth population. The youths who make up 
the relatively small group that was chronically without work Freeman and Wise reported had 
distinct characteristics. They were disproportionately black; disproportionately high school 
dropouts, and disproportionately residents of poverty areas.  
 
                                                 
28 H. Feldmann (2009), 'The quality of industrial relations and unemployment in developing countries', Review 
of Development Economics, 13(1), pp. 56–69. 
 
29 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (editors), Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced Countries, 
University of Chicago Press and NBER, 2000 and Freeman, R. B. and D. A. Wise, (editors), The Youth Labor 
Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, University of Chicago Press and NBER, 1982. 
 
30 OECD (2008a), ‘Off to a good start? Youth labour market transitions in OECD countries’, OECD 
Employment Outlook, 2008, pp. 25-77, Paris, France. 
 
31 K.B. Clark and L.H. Summers (1982) 'The dynamics of youth unemployment' in Freeman, R. B. and D. A. 
Wise, (editors), The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, University of 
Chicago Press and NBER.  
 
32 Richard B. Freeman and David A. Wise (1982), 'The youth labor market problem: its nature causes and 
consequences:' in Freeman, R. B. and D. A. Wise, (editors), The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, 
Causes, and Consequences, University of Chicago Press and NBER. 
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 Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) identified one basic pattern in the job market for young 
workers: the disproportionately large response of youth employment or unemployment to 
changes in overall unemployment.
33  They argued that the sensitivity of youth employment 
and unemployment to the overall rate of unemployment dominate sizable demographic and 
structural changes favorable to youth in determining how youths fare in the job market.  This 
was also confirmed in Blanchflower and Freeman (1996) and Makeham (1980).
34  Recently 
OECD (2008a) confirmed this conclusion "Youth unemployment rates are more sensitive to 
business-cycle conditions than the adult unemployment rate and this high-sensitivity tends to 
decline progressively with age".
35 
 
There is also evidence that young people do especially well in booms.  Freeman and Rodgers 
(1999) who analyzed the 1990s boom in the United States and found that it substantially 
improved the position of non-college educated young men, especially young African 
Americans who are the most disadvantaged and troubled group in the US.
36  Young men in 
tight labor markets experienced a substantial boost in both employment and earnings. Adult 
men had no gains and their earnings barely changed even in areas where unemployment rates 
were below 4%. Youths did particularly well in areas that started the boom at lower jobless 
rates suggesting they would “benefit especially from consistent full employment” (Freeman 
and Rodgers, 1999, p.2).  As unemployment amongst the young goes down and the 
attractiveness of work increases, because there are more jobs and better paying jobs out there 
and it becomes a virtuous cycle. Freeman and Rodgers found evidence that once that 
occurred in the US the crime rate dropped. Increase aggregate demand and youths, especially 
disadvantaged youths, seem to do best  
 
OECD (2008a) presented evidence on youth (20-24) earnings relative to adult earnings 
across countries.  The evidence is presented below and suggests that a) this ratio in the UK 
has fallen over time and b) now is below the OECD average but was above it in 1996.   
 
          2006        1996 
Australia .73  .74 
Canada .64  .62 
Denmark .65  .72 
Finland .68  .70 
                                                 
33 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (2000). 
 
34 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman  (1996), 'Growing into Work: Youth and the Labour Market over the 
1980s and 1990s', OECD Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris and P. Makeham (1980), 'Youth unemployment.  
An examination of evidence on youth unemployment using national statistics', Department of Employment 
Research Paper No. 10, London.  
 
35 OECD (2008a), 'Off to a good start? Youth labour market transitions in OECD countries', OECD 
Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris. 
 
36  Freeman, R.B. and W.M. Rodgers (1999), ‘Area economic conditions and the labor market outcomes of 
young men in the 1990s expansion’, NBER Working Paper #7073, Cambridge, MA. 
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 Germany .61  .62 
Ireland .67  .61 
Japan .60  .62 
New Zealand  .75  .75 
Sweden .68  .73 
UK .60  .68 
USA .57  .58 
OECD .64  .67 
 
Interestingly, such evidence there is that the high relative wages of the young being 
responsible for pricing them out of the jobs comes only from the 1970s.  Interestingly, that is 
the period of most rapid increase in union activity.  Union membership peaked in the 1970s 
with union density – the proportion of workers who are members of trade unions - at a little 
over 50% (Lindsay, 2003).  Since that time union membership numbers and density rates 
have fallen.  In 2007 union density had fallen to 25% and 15.9% among private sector British 
employees.  Unions generally operate rates for the job, which would have the effect of 
raising the relative wage of the young, and hence making them relatively less attractive, and 
then lowering their employment.   
 
In an important early contribution Ellwood (1982) examined the persistence and long-term 
impacts of early labor force experiences. The paper reports a rise in employment rates for a 
cohort of young men as they age, but points out that those persons with poor employment 
records early have comparatively poor records later.  The paper found that the effects of a 
period without work do not end with that spell.  A teenager who spends time out of work in 
one year will probably spend less time working in the next than he would have had he 
worked the entire year.  Furthermore, the lost work experience Ellwood concluded were 
reflected in considerably lower wages. The reduced employment effects Ellwood examined 
appeared to die off very quickly.  What appeared to persist were effects of lost work 
experience on wages.  More recently Mroz and Savage (2006) reached a similar conclusion 
using data from the NLSY for the US and also found evidence of long-lived blemishes from 
unemployment.  A six month spell of unemployment at age 22 would result in an 8 per cent 
lower wage at 23 and even at ages 30 and 31 wages were 2-3 per cent lower than they 
otherwise would have been.  Kletzer and Fairlie (1999) also using data for the US estimate 
that for young unemployed workers the costs of job loss in terms of annual earnings are 8.4% 
and 13.0%, for boys and girls, respectively.
37   
 
Gregg and Tominey (2005) found using data from the NCDS for the UK that there was a 
significant wage penalty of youth unemployment even after controlling for education, region 
and a wealth of family and personal characteristics.  Their results suggested a scar from 
youth unemployment of 13-21% age 41 although this penalty was lower at 9-11% if 
                                                 
37 T.A. Mroz and T.H. Savage (2006), 'The long-term effects of youth unemployment', Journal of Human 
Resources, Spring, 41(2), pp. 259-293. R. Fairlie and L.G. Kletzer (2003), 'The long-term costs of job 
displacement among young workers,' Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56(4), pp. 682-698. 
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 individuals avoid repeat exposure.
38 Gregg (2001) also used NCDS data to show that 
unemployment experience up to the age of 23 drives unemployment in subsequent years.
39  
 
Arulampalam (2001) found that joblessness leaves permanent scars on people and reduces 
the probability of employment and future earnings and increases the risk of future 
unemployment. She found that a spell of unemployment carries a wage penalty of 6% on re-
entry in Britain, and after three years, they are earning 14% less compared to what they 
would have received absent unemployment. Arulampalam et al (2000) also found evidence 
of unemployment persistence, especially for young men.  Narendranathan and Elias (1993) 
also find evidence of state dependence and report that ‘the odds of becoming unemployed are 
2.3 times higher for youths who were unemployed last year than for youths who were not 
unemployed’ (p.183). Arulampalam et al. (2001) also report that the best predictor of an 
individual's future risk of unemployment is his past history of unemployment.  They find that 
unemployment has a scarring effect for both future unemployment and future earnings.  In 
addition Burgess et al. (1999) find that unemployment while young raises the probability of 
subsequent unemployment, but the size of any effect varies by skill level.
40 
 
Bell and Blanchflower (2009) found, using data from the British birth cohort the NCDS that 
youth unemployment continues to hurt two decades later on a variety of variables including 
unemployment, health status, wages and job satisfaction in contrast to unemployment when 
in one’s early thirties.  As we will see, there are permanent scars from youth unemployment. 
A spell of unemployment when young continues to have a harmful impact in later life.   
Youth unemployment is harmful and needs to be avoided. 
 
So we need to deal with unemployment with a particular focus on the young.  The youth 
cohort is currently large.  It is time to act to ensure they are not a lost generation.  
 
7. Policy Measures 
It seems to us that there are a number of measures that can be taken to deal with the crisis. 
 
i) Maintain or even increase aggregate demand  
                                                 
38 P.A. Gregg and E. Tominey (2005), 'The wage scar from male youth unemployment', Labour Economics, 12, 
pp. 487-509 
 
39 P. Gregg (2001), 'The impact of youth unemployment on adult unemployment in NCDS', Economic Journal, 
111(475), pp. F623-F653. 
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 The main issue in the current recession is the lack of demand.  Unemployment has not risen 
because people have chosen to be unemployed.  Unemployment is largely involuntary.  The 
reserve army of the unemployed is a conscript army and not a volunteer army.   
Unemployment makes people unhappy.  It lowers the happiness of the people who are 
unemployed but it also lowers the happiness of everyone else.  Rising unemployment lowers 
well-being more than rising inflation.
41   
 
In its 2009 Economic Outlook the OECD forecast unemployment rates for 2010 as follows.  
We also present the latest unemployment rates from the OECD website. 
 
                                             2010   2009                                                    2010     2009 
Australia  7.7 5.8  Luxembourg  7.2 6.4 
Austria  7.9 4.4  Mexico  6.9 5.7 
Belgium  10.6 8.0  Netherlands  7.0 3.4 
Canada  9.8 8.6  New  Zealand  7.9 6.0 
Czech  Republic  9.2 6.4  Norway  4.3 3.1 
Denmark  7.9 5.9  Poland  11.6 8.2 
Finland  10.8 8.7  Portugal  11.2 9.2 
France 11.2  9.8  Slovak  Republic  13.6  12.0 
Germany 11.6  7.7  Spain 19.6  18.5 
Greece  10.3 8.7  Sweden  11.4 9.2 
Hungary 11.7  10.3  Switzerland  5.1  4.1 
Iceland  9.9 7.0  United  Kingdom  9.7 7.7 
Ireland 14.8  12.5  United  States  10.1  9.7 
Italy  10.2 7.4  Euro  area  12.0 9.5 
Japan  5.7 5.7  Total  OECD  9.8 8.5 
Korea 3.9  3.8   
 
Unemployment rates are predicted to increase a lot further in most countries.  The main 
exceptions are Japan and South Korea. They are predicted to be above ten percent in 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, teh 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, the USA and the Euro area as a whole.   Unemployment 
levels of this kind have not been seen for a number of decades.   If there is a double-dip 
recession these will be under-estimates. 
 
It appears that unemployment rates are especially high among minorities, the least skilled and 
the young.  The fear is that these high levels of unemployment will generate social unrest and 
rising levels of crime, especially property crime.  We need to act to prevent this. 
 
The fiscal and monetary authorities across the OECD have implemented dramatic loosening 
of policy.  Interest rates have come down to historically low levels.  Central banks have 
moved to quantitative easing, increasing the supply of money.  There have been various 
kinds of fiscal stimuli directed at jobs including the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
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 Act of 2009.  The various 'cash for clunkers' and 'cash for bangers' programmes appear to 
have at least temporarily increased the demand for cars.  The worry is that demand will now 
start to fall again once the programs have ceased. 
 
There is still the issue in many countries that banks are not lending enough and the gap left 
by foreign and secondary lenders that have withdrawn have yet to be dealt with.  The 
interaction between rising unemployment and negative equity is likely to present a further 
difficulty in a number of countries.  The question is to what extent have the problem of toxic 
assets been dealt with.  The worry is that there is a lot more to come and forecasts are overly 
optimistic.  Forecasters missed the recession on the way down and may well be too optimistic 
on the way up.  There is still a fear of a Japan type lost decade. 
 
Withdrawing fiscal and monetary stimulus too early is likely to kill off any budding shoots.  
Winter approaches. 
 
ii) Target assistance on the young 
We have indicated that a significant rise in unemployment is likely during 2009 and 2010 at 
least.  Young workers are especially vulnerable to a rise in unemployment. So what kinds of 
policies might be worth considering, in order to dissipate these costs?   
 
a) Active Labour Market Programs 
There is a substantial body of literature that analyses the effectiveness of labour market 
policies for the young.  This work is summarized in Bell and Blanchflower (2008).  In 
Europe there seems to be little evidence that active labor market policies have had a positive 
impact on participants’ wages. There is stronger evidence that they have had positive 
employment effects but there is no consensus on the question.  Even if there were, it is 
unclear the extent to which any of the newly created jobs constitute net job creation or are 
offset by the displacement of non-participants.  In 1996 when asked how much training 
schemes in the US help their clientele Nobel Laureate Jim Heckman replied that ‘zero is not 
a bad number’ (Economist, 6
th  April, 1996).  
 
In our view there is little evidence to support large scale, active labour market programs to 
help the young or any other group.  In a recession when unemployment rates are high job 
placement rates from any ALMP are likely to plummet and the schemes are unlikely to 
provide adequate rates of return.  
 
b) Expansion of education. 
A traditional response of young people in recessions is to withdraw from the labour force.  
Applications to colleges and universities rise.  This is a sensible response and to be 
encouraged.  Temporary expansion iof the number of places in higher and tertiary education 
makes sense.  Possibilities exist to also encourage young people to remain in high school, 
perhaps with financial inducements.  Given the declining size of the youth cohort any 
expansion in the numbers is likely to be temporary as a) the numbers fall b) the recession 
recedes.   
 
c) Wage/employment subsidies for the young 
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 Given the evidence that a spell of unemployment while young has especially harmful effects 
there is an argument to provide subsidies to private sector firms to hire them.  This could take 
the form of a subsidy for every additional new worker hired.  The concern would be that 
older workers would be fired but the subsidy should be based on additional net hires. 
 
d) Incentives for hiring the young in public sector organisations such as in education and 
health 
One possibility would be to allow public sector organisations to hire young people for say, 
two years, and pay them the equivalent of the benefits they would have received on 
unemployment benefits.  This would be subsidized training. 
 
e) Lowering the minimum wage for the young. 
Where the minimum wage is high there is an argument to have it lowered.  The issue is 
whether there is evidence that it is a binding constraint.  One possibility would be to 
temporarily remove it for anyone under age 25, for two years. 
 
iii) Other measures 
Governments around the world have responded to the unemployment crisis with a variety of 
fiscal measures.  Perhaps the most well known example is the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), which was signed into law by President Obama 
on February 17th, 2009.  According to the US Department of Labor the Act includes 
"measures to modernize the infrastructure, enhance energy independence, expand educational 
opportunities, preserve and improve affordable health care, provide tax relief, and protect 
those in greatest need".
42  As is made clear in an interesting report by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, there have been a 
variety of 'anti-crisis' packages in European countries.
43  Measures in other countries have 
included the following. 
i) Training and non-dismissal requirements (e.g. Austria and Luxembourg). 
ii) Use of short-time work or temporary layoff (e.g. France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and 
Belgium). 
iii) Reductions in social security contributions (e.g. Germany, Bulgaria, Slovenia and 
Portugal). 
iv) Tax exemptions or deferrals for enterprises (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands). 
v) Income tax cuts (e.g. Latvia, Italy and Poland). 
vi) VAT tax cuts (e.g. UK). 
vii) Direct and indirect enterprise support (Estonia, France, Italy, Sweden and Poland). 
viii) Job matching, counseling and career guidance (e.g. Sweden and the UK). 
ix) Incentives for companies to employ additional workers especially from vulnerable groups 
(e.g. France, Slovenia and the UK). 
x) Retraining of unemployed people (e.g. France and the Netherlands). 
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 xi) Mobility grants (e.g. Belgium and the Czech Republic). 
xii) Supporting self-employment including funding for business start-ups (e.g. Romania, 
Bulgaria, Austria and the UK). 
xiii) Extension of the duration of unemployment benefits e.g. USA. 
 
The difficulty is that there are simply insufficient jobs available.  This means that measures 
such as retraining, mobility grants and counseling are unlikely to be successful on their own.  
At the very least they will not be as successful as they were when unemployment was low.  
Expansion of self-employment may well get unemployment down but doesn't deal with the 
problem that there is little work out there so earnings may well be very low.  Architects aren't 
finding much work currently.  Directly stimulative measures are likely to be most successful 
including use of short-time work subsidies, tax exemptions, tax cuts and incentives to employ 
additional workers.  The exact choice will depend on a particular country's needs.  It is likely 
to be important going forward to ensure adequate access to capital for firms.  This is likely to 
be of particular concern for small firms.  Despite the existence of all of these various 
measures unemployment continues to rise apace.  It clearly would have been worse absent 
the programs, but they are clearly not enough.   
 
The loss of output associated with this slump may be permanent in some developed 
countries, in which case the price of labour may have to fall in the longer-run in order to 
return to full employment. For those countries with a substantial fiscal deficit, downward 
pressure on wages is likely to be strongest in the public sector. But these are longer term 
objectives of policy which should only be addressed once recovery is secure. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
The recession has hit right across the world, with consequent adverse effects on the demand 
for labor. The effects on output have varied across countries, depending on asset bubbles, 
imbalances in private or government debt and trade imbalances. 
 
Governments have generally reacted by stimulating demand through fiscal measures, thus 
partly offsetting the fall in private sector demand caused by credit restrictions and the loss of 
consumer and business confidence.  Central banks around the world, including the Federal 
Reserve, the Bank of England, the ECB and the Sveriges Riksbank, have cut interest rates 
close to zero and engaged in quantitative easing for the first time since the 1930s to get their 
various economies moving again in the face of a threat of deflation. 
Some countries have intervened more decisively than others in the labor market.  Measures 
to subsidizes those in work have reduced redundancy levels are maintained demand 
particularly in countries where the replacement ratio is low. The ILO has estimated that 
without discretionary fiscal measures and the effects of automatic stabilizers, unemployment 
would have been between 7 and 11 million higher in the G20 countries during 2009. 
Thus far, at a country level, increases in unemployment have not been closely related to falls 
in output.  In some countries, the increase in unemployment has far exceeded the reduction in 
output.  This may reflect increases in labor supply, large-scale redundancies among low 
skilled workers and/or barriers to adjustment of labor inputs that fall short of redundancy. 
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 The countries that experienced the largest increases in unemployment tended to experience 
asset bubbles that peaked in 2006 or 2007. Unemployment has risen rapidly in Spain, USA, 
Ireland and the Baltic States. Countries that were over-reliant on exports (e.g. Germany and 
Japan) have experienced large falls in output, but increases in unemployment have been 
moderate, perhaps because of policy interventions or because management has decided to 
hoard labor.  
Historic evidence suggests that financial crises have a long-term negative effect on economic 
growth. With a severe crisis, the fall could amount to a permanent reduction of output of as 
much as 4%. This will inevitably impact the demand for labor.  In these circumstances, 
engineering a return to full employment will be a huge challenge for the policy community. It 
is not clear that the supply-side policies that were popular in the 1990s and early part of this 
decade will form part of the solution. Perhaps further extension of the job saving measures 
that have been implemented may be necessary to maintain demand, albeit at the cost of 
higher government debt.  Moves to cut public expenditure as suggested by some political 
groups, deep in a recession are a mistake.  The danger is that they will turn a recession into a 
depression.  As Keynes' biographer Lord Robert Skidelsky has noted recently there is no 
reason why this should become a depression.
44 
“How long will the slump last?  This is the worst global turndown since the 
Great Depression.  But it is highly unlikely to be as bad.  The years 1929-32 
saw twelve successive quarters of economic contraction.  If repeated, this would 
mean the economic slide will continue till mid 2011.  But the present 
contraction will be neither as deep nor as long and this for two reasons.  First, 
the will to international cooperation is stronger.  Second, we do have Keynes.  
To be a Keynesian in the ‘foxhole’ is not enough.  But it is better than to be a 
classical economist in the foxhole, which was the only intellectual support that 
perplexed policymakers had available during the Great Depression.   
Governments at that time made heroic efforts to balance their budgets: they 
allowed banks to fail and households to default on their mortgages; they stuck to 
the gold standard which kept interest rates high for the first two years of the 
slump.  Today the intellectual climate is different.  The ‘stimuli’, which have 
been put in place, will stop the slide into another Great Depression.  The 
financial system will be cleaned up, and money will become very cheap, but the 
collapse of confidence will continue to depress new investment for years 
ahead.”   (Skidelsky 2009, p.15) 
and later. 
“Keynes’s big idea was to use macroeconomic policy to maintain full 
employment.  His specific suggestion was to use monetary policy to secure a 
permanently low interest rate and fiscal policy to achieve a continuously high 
level of public or semi-public investment.  Over time, as the returns on further 
additions to capital fell, the high-investment policy should yield to the 
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 encouragement of consumption through redistributing income from the higher 
to the lower-saving section of the population.  This should be coupled with a 
reduction in the hours of work.  In short, the object of macro-policy should be to 
keep the economy in ‘quasi-boom’ till the economic problem was solved and 
people could live ‘wisely, and agreeably, and well’. (Skidelsky 2009, p.179). 
We are not at that point yet of quasi-boom.  We are still experiencing the dragging conditions 
of semi-slump. 
Policy makers around the world appear to have understood this need for stimulus.  What has 
been absent from the policy response thus far, though, is a coherent approach to the treatment 
of younger people who have not yet entered the labor market.  We know that these are 
particularly vulnerable individuals, whose long-term opportunities can be damaged by 
adverse events early in their labor market experience. We also understand that the discounted 
social and health costs associated with youth unemployment are extremely high. It is thus 
extremely important to introduce policies which enhance the skills and capabilities of 
younger workers and which assist them to join the labor market as quickly as possible.     
Spells of unemployment while young create permanent scars.  Unemployment is higher in 
the years ahead if a young person doesn't make a successful toe-hold into the labour market 
early in their lives.  Solving youth unemployment is the most pressing problem governments 
are facing today.  Not dealing with the problem of high, and rising levels of youth 
unemployment hurts the youngsters themselves and has potentially severe consequences for 




Table 1.  Change in Output from 2008 Quarter 3 to 2009 Q2. 
      
Percentage change compared with the 
previous quarter  
Percentage change compared with 
the same quarter of the previous 
year  
 2008  2008  2009  2009  2008  2009  2008  2009 
 Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 
EA16   -0.3 -1.8  -2.5  -0.1  0.5 -1.7  -4.9  -4.7 
EU27   -0.4 -1.9  -2.4  -0.2  0.7 -1.7  -4.8  -4.8 
Austria   -0.3 -1.0  -2.7  -0.4  2.2 0.2  -3.5  -4.4 
Belgium   0.0 -1.7  -1.7  -0.4  1.1 -1.0  -3.1  -3.8 
Cyprus   0.1 0.2  -0.6  -0.5  3.3 2.5  0.8  -0.7 
Czech Republic   0.6 -1.8  -3.4  :  3.1 -0.1  -3.4  : 
Denmark   -0.9 -2.0  -1.1  :  -1.7 -3.7  -4.3 : 
Estonia   -2.8 -5.3  -6.1  -3.7  -3.5 -9.7  -15.1  -16.6 
Finland   -0.9 -2.1  -2.7  :  0.7 -2.6  -6.0  : 
France   -0.2 -1.4  -1.3  0.3  0.1 -1.6  -3.4  -2.6 
Germany   -0.3 -2.4  -3.5  0.3  0.8 -1.8  -6.7  -5.9 
Greece   0.4 0.3  -1.2  0.3  2.7 2.4  0.3  -0.2 
Hungary   -1.0 -1.9  -2.6  -2.1  0.3 -2.2  -5.6  -7.4 
Iceland   2.9 -0.9  -3.6  :  -1.3 -1.3  -3.3 : 
Ireland   0.6 -5.4  -1.5  :  -1.2 -8.0  -8.4 : 
Italy   -0.8 -2.1  -2.7  -0.5  -1.3 -3.0  -6.0  -6.0 
Japan   -1.0 -3.5  -3.1  0.9  -0.3 -4.5  -8.3  -6.5 
Latvia   -1.8 -4.9  -11.0  -1.6  -5.8 -10.8  -18.6  -18.2 
Lithuania   -0.3 -1.4  -10.2  -9.8  2.0 -1.3  -11.6  -20.4 
Luxembourg   -0.6 -3.6  -1.5  :  -0.9 -5.0  -5.4 : 
Malta   -0.3 -1.1  -1.3  :  2.1 -0.3  -2.4  : 
Netherlands   -0.4 -1.0  -2.7  -0.9  1.9 -0.7  -4.5  -5.1 
Norway   -0.9 0.4  -0.8  -1.3  1.2 0.5  -0.7  -2.5 
Poland   0.6 -0.1  0.3  0.5  4.9 2.6  1.7  1.4 
Portugal   -0.5 -1.8  -1.6  0.3  0.3 -2.0  -3.7  -3.7 
Romania   -0.1 -2.8  -4.6  -1.2  9.2 2.9  -6.2  -8.8 
Slovakia  1.8 2.1  -11.0  2.2  6.6 2.5  -5.6  -5.3 
Slovenia   0.7 -4.1  -6.4  0.7  3.7 -0.9  -8.9  -9.0 
Spain   -0.6 -1.1  -1.6  -1.1  0.5 -1.2  -3.2  -4.2 
Sweden   -0.5 -5.0  -0.9  0.0  0.2 -5.1  -6.3  -6.3 
Switzerland   -0.4 -0.6  -0.9  -0.3  1.3 -0.2  -1.6  -2.1 
United Kingdom   -0.7 -1.8  -2.4  -0.7  0.5 -1.8  -4.9  -5.5 
United States   -0.7 -1.4  -1.6  -0.3  0.0 -1.9  -3.3  -3.9 
 
Source:  Eurostat 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-02092009-BP/EN/2-02092009-BP-
EN.PDF  Table 2.  Turning Points Based on Output 
 
Change in Output             





Turkey 148.2  2008Q1  20.2  1 
Slovak Republic  166.8  2008Q4  19.1  1 
Ireland 147.4  2007Q1  14.2  1 
Mexico 121.7  2008Q2  10.7  1 
Japan 112.6  2008Q1  9.5  1 
Luxembourg 134.9  2007Q4  8.6  1 
Iceland 139.9  2007Q3  8.0  1 
Sweden 122.9  2008Q1  7.8  2 
Germany 111.2  2008Q1  7.7  1 
Finland 126.3  2008Q1  7.6  1 
Czech Republic  141.6  2008Q3  7.2  1 
Hungary 132.1  2008Q1  7.2  1 
UK 121.3  2008Q2  6.6  2 
Italy 108.6  2008Q1  6.5  1 
Denmark 110.9  2007Q4  5.3  1 
Netherlands 117.3  2008Q1  4.9  1 
USA 119.5  2008Q2  4.7  2 
Belgium 116.4  2008Q3  4.4  2 
Portugal 108.6  2008Q2  4.2  1 
Spain 128.5  2008Q2  4.1  1 
South Korea  142.9  2008Q3  3.9  2 
New Zealand  127.8  2007Q4  3.8  1 
France 114.9  2008Q1  3.7  1 
Austria 118.3  2008Q3  3.5  1 
Canada 120.4  2007Q4  2.7  1 
Greece 138.3  2008Q4  1.6  1 
Norway 120.4  2008Q2  0.5  1 
Australia 128.4  2008Q3  0.3  1 
Poland 139.6  2009Q1  0  1 
Euro Area  115.6  2008Q1  5.6  1 
European Union  117.9  2008Q1  5.6  1 
G7 116.4  2008Q2  5.4  1 
OECD Total  119.5  2008Q1  5.6  1 
























Ireland 2,145  2008Q1 185  8.6%  1  127.6% 
Spain 20,532  2008Q1 1321  6.4%  2  55.1% 
United States  146,275  2007Q4 5684  3.9%  2  75.1% 
Hungary 3907  2007Q2 135  3.5%  1  198.5% 
Sweden 4,630  2008Q3 126  2.7%  2  97.7% 
Japan 64,230  2007Q2 1567  2.4%  2  169.8% 
Slovakia 2,460  2008Q3 58  2.4%  1  28.4% 
Canada 17,146  2008Q4 302  1.8%  2  64.3% 
Portugal 5,178  2008Q2 90  1.7%  1  134.3% 
Turkey 21,566  2008Q2 373  1.7%  1  33.9% 
Denmark 2,833  2008Q2 41  1.4%  1  83.7% 
Italy 23,191  2008Q2 273  1.2%  1  81.7% 
Belgium 4,465  2008Q3 47  1.1%  1  71.2% 
Czech Republic  5,010  2008Q4 57  1.1%  1  78.1% 
Greece 4,566  2008Q4 48  1.1%  1  72.7% 
United Kingdom   29,512  2008Q2 319  1.1%  1  55.2% 
Austria 4,099  2008Q4 40  1.0%  1  571.4% 
Germany 39,169  2008Q4 325  0.8%  1  116.1% 
Norway 2,515  2008Q4 18  0.7%  1  85.7% 
South Korea  23,612  2008Q3 176  0.7%  2  451.3% 
France 25,942  2008Q4 112  0.4%  1  24.9% 
Poland 15,942  2008Q4 45  0.3%  1  18.6% 
Australia 10,804  2009Q1 20  0.2%  2  10.3% 
Netherlands 7,443  2009Q1 0  0.0%  1  0.0% 
 

















Spain 7.9  May-07  10.2  2399  Jun 
Ireland 4.2  Aug-07  8.0  145  Jun 
United States  4.4  Mar-07  5.0  7567  Jul 
Turkey 8.1  Dec-06  4.4  1099  Mar 
Hungary 6.1  Mar-08  4.2 68  Jun 
Sweden 5.6  Jun-08  3.4  129  Jun 
Denmark 3.1  Jun-08  3.1 49  Jun 
UK 4.6  Mar-08  2.9  578  Apr 
Canada 5.8  Jan-08  2.8  470  Jul 
OECD - Total  5.6  Jun-07  2.7   15,121  Jun 
Slovak Republic  9.0  Oct-08  2.7  39  Jun 
Luxembourg 4.0  Sep-07  2.4    4  Jun 
Mexico 3.2  May-08  2.4  697  Jun 
Portugal 6.9  May-08  2.4  67  Jun 
Finland 6.2  Apr-08  2.3  57  Jun 
OECD - Europe  6.8  Apr-08  2.1   5,483  Jun 
Czech Republic  4.3  Sep-08  2.0  73  Jun 
Australia 3.9  Feb-08  1.9  195  Jul 
France 7.6  Apr-08  1.8  450  Jun 
Japan 3.6  Jul-07  1.8  923  Jun 
Belgium 6.6  May-08  1.5  66  Jun 
Italy 5.9  Jun-07  1.5  334  Mar 
Poland 6.8  Oct-08  1.4  242  Jun 
Greece 7.5  Jun-08  1.2  66  Mar 
South Korea  3.0  Jan-08  1.0  204  Jun 
Austria 3.6  Jun-08  0.8  7  Jun 
Norway 2.3  Mar-08  0.8  21  Apr 
Germany 7.1  Dec-08  0.6  280  Jun 
Netherlands 2.7  Nov-08  0.6  32  Jun 
 




Table 5. House Price Inflation 2009 
 
Country 
Year on Year 
Change to 2009 Q1  Country 
Year on Year 
Change to 2009 Q1 
Israel  10.9%  Canada  -2.4% 
Czech Republic  9.9%  Luxembourg  -2.4% 
Switzerland  5.6%  Slovenia  -3.1% 
India  5.1%  China  -3.9% 
Indonesia  4.6%  New Zealand  -4.0% 
Austria  4.1%  Croatia  -4.5% 
Russia  3.6%  Malta  -5.6% 
Bulgaria  3.3%  France  -5.7% 
Belgium  2.7%  Portugal  -5.9% 
Hungary  2.5%  Australia  -6.7% 
Netherlands  1.0%  Spain  -6.8% 
Lithuania  0.8%  Norway  -9.4% 
Slovakia  0.3%  Ireland  -10.0% 
Italy  0.1%  Denmark  -11.6% 
South Africa  -0.3%  Poland  -13.0% 
Sweden  -0.6%  Hong Kong  -15.7% 
Finland  -0.7%  Estonia  -16.2% 
Germany  -1.5%  UK  -16.5% 
Greece  -1.5%  USA  -16.9% 
Ukraine  -2.3%  Latvia  -36.0% 
 







Table 6. Co-movement of Output and Employment 
 
       
Fall in Employment 
 
      < 2%  >2% and < 4%  >4% 
< 2% 
Australia            
Greece            
Norway          
Poland  
     
>2% and < 4% 
Austria            
Canada             
France  
South Korea  






Belgium       
Czech Republic 




Portugal   
Turkey  
United Kingdom
Hungary               
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Source: OECD Main Economic IndicatorsTable 7. Youth unemployment rates (age under 25) - % 
 














EA16   15.4 19.4 19.6 19.7 9.5 2.1 
EU27   15.4 19.5 19.7 19.8 9.0 2.2 
Austria   7.3 8.3 8.3 8.2  4.4  1.9 
Belgium   19.9 21.9 22.1 21.6 8.0 2.7 
Bulgaria   12.0 14.9 15.3 15.9 7.0 2.3 
Cyprus  9.0 12.6 12.6  : 5.5 2.3 
Czech Rep.   9.8 13.4 13.6 13.7 6.4 2.1 
Denmark  7.9 11.1 11.4 11.2 5.9 1.9 
Finland   16.5 21.5 22.1 22.6 8.7 2.6 
France  19.3 23.8 24.0 24.2 9.8 2.5 
Germany  9.6 11.0 11.1 11.2 7.7 1.5 
Hungary   19.9 27.0 26.6 25.8  10.3 2.5 
Ireland   12.4 24.9 25.3 25.5  12.5 2.0 
Latvia  13.0 29.2 29.2  :  17.4 1.7 
Lithuania  14.9 30.9 30.9  :  16.7 1.9 
Luxembourg  17.0 20.0 20.3 20.5 6.4 3.2 
Malta   12.2 14.9 15.1 15.1 7.3 2.1 
Netherlands  5.3 6.3 6.5 6.6  3.4  1.9 
Poland  16.6 19.6 19.8 19.8 8.2 2.4 
Portugal  16.7 19.8 19.5 18.9 9.2 2.1 
Slovak Rep.  19.0 25.0 25.5  26  12.0 2.2 
Slovenia  10.2 16.0 16.0  : 6.0 2.7 
Spain   25.0 37.0 37.5 38.4  18.5 2.1 
Sweden   17.7 26.2 26.8 27.3 9.2 3.0 
UK   15.0 19.2  :  : 7.8 2.5 
USA   13.5 17.3 17.8 17.8 9.4 1.9 
 




 Table 8.  Size of youth cohort in 2008 where the number of 20 year olds=100 
   5 yrs  10 yrs  15 yrs  25 yrs  # Age 20  
Euro area   87.6  88.3  93.3  110.8  3,814,153 
Armenia  50.0 70.2 93.7 91.7  63,333 
Australia 89.3  92.1  96.2  104.4  296,556 
Austria 81.5  88.2  99.4  111.7  100,537 
Belarus  53.9 54.1 77.0 97.4  162,934 
Belgium 90.7  95.0  102.4  105.3  127,376 
Bulgaria 64.5  57.4  80.0  104.7  103,028 
Croatia 73.0  92.7  88.4  112.2  55,644 
Cyprus 68.3  81.8  99.4  114.5  11,757 
Czech Republic  69.5  67.3  90.7  109.4  134,600 
Denmark 104.9  111.6  114.3  98.3  61,689 
Estonia  59.1 55.2 76.4 93.0  21,838 
Finland 90.8  96.8  109.2  111.6  61,957 
France 97.4  93.0  96.2  101.9  817,614 
Georgia  62.8 73.6 96.8 94.1  72,102 
Germany   73.6  83.1  85.8  102.7  982,931 
Greece 87.4  88.0  94.8  130.2  119,656 
Hungary 76.8  78.5  95.6  108.5  125,807 
Iceland 93.6  98.2  106.9  109.7  4,399 
Ireland 104.1  98.2  95.1  136.5  59,194 
Italy 93.8  93.0  100.2  115.1  591,715 
Latvia  52.8 48.6 79.6 91.8  37,681 
Lithuania  53.3 65.6 93.6 87.3  55,381 
Luxembourg  104.3 109.7 106.5 115.3  5,504 
Macedonia 68.8  77.7  93.5  100.0  33,263 
Moldova  49.3 58.4 80.2 82.3  73,876 
Montenegro 80.4  82.1  90.7  100.9  10,053 
Netherlands 101.2  97.9  101.3  97.3  198,534 
Norway  98.5 107.1 108.8 100.2  58,239 
Poland 60.7  70.2  87.0  113.6  579,666 
Portugal 94.3  88.4  93.8  124.6  120,091 
Romania  58.5 62.2 71.1 89.0  352,397 
Russian  Federation  53.7 49.9 65.4 96.6  2,556,769 
Serbia 81.6  78.0  87.4  106.2  95,973 
Slovakia 61.1  70.1  89.4  109.8  82,551 
Slovenia 67.7  70.1  76.8  111.0  26,541 
Spain 88.9  81.6  86.8  131.5  502,550 
Sweden 86.2  82.4  110.5  94.9  115,360 
Switzerland 84.1  92.3  102.2  106.9  88,726 
Ukraine  51.7 57.4 76.6 97.8  744,442 
United  Kingdom  80.9 89.4 96.1 97.6  820,200 
USA 96.7  94.2  102.3  102.8  4,168,920 
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 Table 9.  Unemployment Rate by Age and Educational Attainment 2008 Quarter 3 
   Total  ISCED 0-2  ISCED 3-4  ISCED 5-6 
   15-24  25-64  15-24  25-64  15-24  25-64  15-24  25-64 
European Union (27 countries)  15.6  5.7 21.2  9.4 12.7  5.2 13.3  3.5 
Euro area   15.3  6.2 19.7  9.8 12.4  5.5 12.5  3.9 
Austria 8.2  3.0 12.0  6.0 5.9  2.7 :  1.9 
Belgium 22.7  6.2 32.7  11.6 18.3  5.7 21.5  3.5 
Bulgaria 11.4  4.6 25.6  12.1 8.5  3.6 :  1.9 
Croatia 20.2  5.6 :  7.3 18.7  5.7 :  3.8 
Cyprus 8.4  3.2 7.2  4.1 6.7  2.8 12.1  2.9 
Czech Republic  10.3  3.8 33.4  16.4 7.5  3.1 11.4  1.9 
Denmark 8.7  2.4 8.9  2.9 7.9  2.2 :  2.2 
Estonia 14.7  5.0 :  10.8 13.1  5.5 :  2.9 
Finland 11.2  4.8 17.9  7.7 7.9  5.0 :  3.4 
France 17.7  5.9 29.0  9.3 16.3  5.4 9.3  3.9 
Germany   11.0  6.6 15.2  15.6 7.7  6.5 :  3.1 
Greece 21.3  6.2 17.8  6.2 22.2  6.6 25.7  5.7 
Hungary 20.8  6.7 32.1  16.3 18.1  6.1 19.2  2.4 
Ireland 15.1  5.2 27.2  8.7 13.0  4.8 9.7  3.3 
Italy 19.5  5.1 21.3  6.7 18.7  4.0 15.2  4.3 
Latvia 12.2  6.7 18.4  12.1 10.2  7.1 :  3.7 
Lithuania 15.0  4.9 27.0  8.3 11.2  6.1 16.8  2.4 
Luxembourg   23.9  3.6 22.6  4.7 24.5  4.1 :  2.1 
Netherlands 4.9  1.9 6.6  2.8 3.5  1.8 :  1.4 
Norway 7.2  1.7 9.8  3.7 4.3  1.2 :  1.4 
Poland 16.1  5.6 16.5  10.2 15.6  5.8 20.0  3.2 
Portugal 17.1  7.2 16.4  7.5 13.0  6.6 34.3  6.8 
Romania 19.2  4.1 20.1  5.5 18.0  4.2 25.6  1.7 
Slovakia 19.4  7.8 52.6  30.3 15.3  6.9 24.9  3.0 
Slovenia 9.1  3.5 10.0  5.9 8.9  3.2 :  3.0 
Spain 24.2  9.8 28.9  13.6 19.1  8.4 17.9  5.9 
Sweden 16.2  4.0 24.6  6.9 9.4  3.8 :  3.3 
United Kingdom  16.7  4.0 30.3  6.6 12.3  4.2 12.4  2.4 
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 Notes: International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels are as follows. 
ISCED 0: PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION.  Pre-primary education (ISCED 0) is defined as the initial stage of organised instruction, designed 
primarily to introduce very young children to a school-type environment, that is, to provide a bridge between home and a school-based 
atmosphere. ISCED 0 does not include early childhood care services as they are not considered as ‘organised instruction’.  
ISCED 1: PRIMARY EDUCATION.  This level is compulsory in all countries and generally begins between five and seven years of age and lasts 
from four to six years.  
ISCED 2: LOWER-SECONDARY EDUCATION. · This level continues the basic programmes of the primary level, although teaching is typically 
more subject-focused. Usually, the end of this level coincides with the end of compulsory education.  
ISCED 3: UPPER-SECONDARY EDUCATION.  This level generally begins at the end of compulsory education. The entrance age is typically 
15 or 16 years. Entrance qualifications (end of compulsory education) and other minimum entry requirements are usually needed. Instruction is 
often more subject-oriented than at ISCED level 2. The typical duration of ISCED level 3 varies from two to five years.  
ISCED 4: POST-SECONDARY NON-TERTIARY LEVEL OF EDUCATION.   ISCED 4 straddles the boundary between upper-secondary and 
post-secondary education from an international point of view. Although their content may not be significantly more advanced than upper-
secondary programmes, they serve to broaden the knowledge of participants who have already gained an upper-secondary qualification.  
ISCED 5: TERTIARY EDUCATION. Post-secondary education is either: 1) Type A – largely theory-based with a minimum cumulative 
theoretical duration (at tertiary level) of three years’ full-time equivalent, although it typically lasts four or more years; or 2) Type B – practical, 
technical or occupational skills-based with a minimum duration of two years full-time equivalent at the tertiary level.  
ISCED 6: SECOND STAGE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION.  This level is reserved for tertiary programmes that lead directly to the award 
of an advanced research qualification. The theoretical duration of these programmes is 3 years full-time in most countries (for a cumulative total of 
at least 7 years FTE at the tertiary level), although the actual enrolment time is typically longer. The programmes are devoted to advanced study 
and original research. For successful completion, requires − The submission of a thesis or dissertation of publishable quality that is the product of 
original research and represents a significant contribution to knowledge. 
− Is not solely based on course-work. 






 Table 10.  Views on the state of the labour market in the United States 
 
a) University of Michigan Survey 
Month Less  Same  More  DK 
Jan-07 12 60 27  1 
Feb-07 8 58 33  1 
Mar-07 10  57  33 0 
Apr-07 9  53 38  0 
May-07 10  59  30 1 
Jun-07 12 51  37  0 
Jul-07 10 56 33  1 
Aug-07 8  52  39  1 
Sep-07 9 54 36  1 
Oct-07 8 54 38  0 
Nov-07 11  50  39 0 
Dec-07 8  45 47  0 
Jan-08 6 46 47  1 
Feb-08 9 41 50  0 
Mar-08 7  38  55  0 
Apr-08 5  36 59  0 
May-08 3  41  56 0 
Jun-08 5 31 64  0 
Jul-08 7 32  61  0 
Aug-08 5  40  55  0 
Sep-08 9 41 50  0 
Oct-08 6 31 62  1 
Nov-08 7  24  69  0 
Dec-08 7  24 69  0 
Jan-09 12 21 66  1 
Feb-09 10 20  69  1 
Average 
2000(1)-
2009(1) 14.0 46.5  38.5 1.0
  
Question.  How about people out of work during the coming 12 months--do you think that there 
will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less? 
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 b) Conference Board – jobs are currently plentiful (%) 
 
                      Plentiful              Not so plentiful      Hard to find        US unemployment    
                          rate (%) 
Jan-07  29.6 50.7 19.7  4.6 
Feb-07  27.8 54.3 17.9  4.5 
Mar-07  30.3 50.8 18.9  4.4 
Apr-07  29.0 50.7 20.3  4.5 
May-07  29.1 51.2 19.7  4.5 
Jun-07  27.6 51.9 20.5  4.6 
Jul-07  30.0 51.3 18.7  4.7 
Aug-07  27.5 52.8 19.7  4.7 
Sep-07  25.6 52.0 22.4  4.7 
Oct-07  24.1 53.1 22.8  4.8 
Nov-07  23.3 55.3 21.4  4.7 
Dec-07  23.6 53.7 22.7  4.9 
Jan-08  23.8 55.6 20.6  4.9 
Feb-08  21.5 55.1 23.4  4.8 
Mar-08  19.2 56.3 24.5  5.1 
Apr-08  17.1 55.0 27.9  5.0 
May-08  16.1 55.6 28.3  5.5 
Jun-08  14.1 56.2 29.7  5.6 
Jul-08  13.6 56.2 30.2  5.8 
Aug-08  13.5 54.8 31.7  6.2 
Sep-08  12.6 55.2 32.2  6.2 
Oct-08  9.0 54.4 36.6  6.6 
Nov-08  8.7 54.2 37.1  6.8 
Dec-08  6.5 52.0 41.5  7.2 
Jan-09  7.1 51.8 41.1  7.6 
Feb-09  4.6 48.5 46.9  8.1 
Mar-09  4.7 46.5 48.8  8.5 
Apr-09  4.9 48.5 46.6  8.9 
May-09  5.8 50.3 43.9  9.4 
Jun-09  4.5 50.7 44.8  9.5 
Jul-09  3.7 47.8 48.5  9.4 
Aug-09  4.2 50.7 45.1  9.7   
Average    21.5   49.8  28.7   
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 Table 11.  The 'fear of unemployment' balances by EU country, January 2008-August 2009 
 
Country  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)    (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Jan-08  13 10  4  3 -2 47 44 25  7 21  -12  1 50 -2 -6 28 
Feb-08  16 14  3  6  3 53 41 28 11 23 -5  2 48  7  4 30 
Mar-08  16 14 -1  4  4 50 45 24 15 24 -5  1 45 -3  3 29 
Apr-08  15 10  5 13 -8 59 44 31 10 21 -2 -1 46 -5  8 35 
May-08  14 10  9 11 -6   45 39 12 16 -4  5 49 -4 13 31 
Jun-08  16 11  7 16 -5   35 44 10 15  0  8 50 -5 20 38 
Jul-08  24 19 16 23  1   52 52 18 26  0 11 54  4 24 48 
Aug-08  28 24 18 17 15   50 46 26 26  6 19 44  3 30 50 
Sep-08  30 25 20 21 13   47 56 29 27 10 18 38  8 32 52 
Oct-08  42 38 44 37 16   59 63 56 33 30 31 53 26 56 60 
Nov-08  52 49 63 41 31   63 67 62 42 52 50 64 44 62 66 
Dec-08  61 59 70 46 48   73 71 68 52 68 57 66 52 64 71 
Jan-09  62 59 67 46 54   59 67 67 46 69 59 77 47 59 75 
Feb-09  65 64 76 51 64   74 68 68 51 77 60 86 50 55 68 
Mar-09  67 69 72 46 72   73 59 74 59 81 64 77 46 58 65 
Apr-09  61 63 70 32 71   70 51 69 45 74 65 73 42 64 59 
May-09  56 58 67 31 70 58 68 35 65 40 61 60 72 33 45 57 
Jun-09  54 55 65 34 67 49 65 31 61 38 68 53 66 30 37 56 
Jul-09  52 53 63 21 63 50 66 29 61 34 73 55 55 29 33 55 
Aug-09  52 53 52 28 62 45 62 32   36 63 46 53 32 21 53 
39 
 Country  (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
Jan-08  7  2  8  -14 37  4  -23 19 47 -4  -12 18 
Feb-08  11 -2 11 -9 36  8  -21 22 46 -3  -17 20 
Mar-08  7 -2 15 -6 35 11  -18 20 49  -13  -13 14 
Apr-08  10  2  5  -10 36 22  -14 18 48  -11  -17 13 
May-08  4  1 12 -8 29 22 -3 18 47  0  -17 11 
Jun-08  10  1  7  -15 33 26  4 16 46  2 -9 14 
Jul-08  9  5 13  -10 33 28 12 22 44  5  -10 13 
Aug-08  6 14 15 -9 33 35 24 22 42  7 -8 12 
Sep-08  3 11 11 -6 30 40 24 25 44  3 -6 15 
Oct-08  14 37 17  0 38 51 40 44 64 16  2 14 
Nov-08  39 45 53 49 47 62 53 54 73 30 13 48 
Dec-08  56 58 61 52 55 75 71 66 81 24 24 60 
Jan-09  52 65 73 54 53 79 78 66 82 22 34 67 
Feb-09  56 65 65 76 61 80 82 70 84 41 57 70 
Mar-09  58 49 67 77 65 75 82 70 80 34 59 74 
Apr-09  63 49 71 63 58 58 77 75 81 33 45 71 
May-09  56 43 56 55 53 49 75 66 75 31 40 71 
Jun-09  55 39 46 51 43 58 67 64 70 27 29 64 
Jul-09  53 43 49 46 50 69 66 57 70 30 32 70 
Aug-09     46 46 48 55 73 71 53 67   30 72 
 
Notes.  Countries are as follows 
1 European Union  11. Netherlands  21. Cyprus   
2. Euro area  12. Austria  22. Latvia   
3. Belgium  13. Portugal  23. Lithuania   
4. Denmark  14. Finland  24. Luxembourg   
5. Germany  15. Sweden  25. Hungary   
6. Ireland  16. United Kingdom  26. Malta   
7. Greece  17. Bulgaria  27. Poland   
8. Spain  18. Czech Republic  28. Romania   
9. France  19. Slovenia     
10. Italy  20. Slovak Republic   
 
Question. How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to change 
over the next 12 months? The number will...+ + increase sharply; + increase slightly; = 
remain the same; − fall slightly; − − fall sharply.   
 
Balances are the difference between positive and negative answering options, measured as 
percentage points of total answers.  If P denotes 'increase slightly', while PP denotes the 
percentage of respondents having chosen the option “increase sharply”, M denotes 'fall 
slightly", MM the percentage of respondents having chosen the option “fall sharply”and N is 
the percentage of respondents without any opinion (so that PP+P+E+M+MM+N=100), then 
the balance is calculated as B = (PP + ½P) − (½M + MM) 
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 Appendix Table 1.  Unemployment rates, January 2008-July 2009 (%) 
  (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12)    (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Jan-2008  6.8 7.3 7.1 3.2 7.8 4.6 7.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 2.8 4.1 7.7 6.4 6.0 5.1 
Feb-2008  6.7 7.2 6.9 3.2 7.6 4.6 7.7 9.2 7.6 6.6 2.8 4.0 7.7 6.3 5.9 5.1 
Mar-2008  6.7 7.2 6.7 3.1 7.5 4.9 7.7 9.4 7.6 6.6 2.8 3.8 7.6 6.3 5.9 5.2 
Apr-2008  6.7 7.3 6.6 3.1 7.4 5.0 7.5 9.9 7.6 6.8 2.8 3.7 7.6 6.2 5.8 5.1 
May-2008  6.8 7.4 6.6 3.1 7.4 5.3 7.5  10.5 7.7 6.8 2.8 3.6 7.6 6.3 5.6 5.3 
Jun-2008  6.9 7.5 6.9 3.1 7.3 5.6 7.5  11.0 7.7 6.8 2.7 3.6 7.7 6.3 5.6 5.4 
Jul-2008  7.0 7.5 7.3 3.2 7.2 6.0 7.6  11.4 7.8 6.8 2.7 3.7 7.8 6.4 5.8 5.7 
Aug-2008  7.0 7.6 7.4 3.3 7.2 6.3 7.6  11.8 7.9 6.8 2.7 3.7 7.8 6.4 6.0 5.8 
Sep-2008  7.1 7.7 7.3 3.4 7.1 6.6 7.6  12.5 8.0 6.8 2.7 3.8 7.8 6.5 6.3 6.0 
Oct-2008  7.3 7.9 7.1 3.6 7.1 7.1 7.9  13.2 8.1 7.0 2.7 4.0 7.9 6.6 6.7 6.2 
Nov-2008  7.4 8.0 7.0 3.8 7.1 7.7 7.9  14.0 8.3 7.0 2.7 4.1 7.9 6.7 7.0 6.3 
Dec-2008  7.6 8.2 7.1 4.1 7.1 8.2 7.9  14.7 8.4 7.0 2.8 4.2 8.2 6.8 7.0 6.5 
Jan-2009  8.0 8.5 7.5 4.4 7.2 9.3 8.7  15.6 8.6 7.4 2.8 4.2 8.5 7.1 7.3 6.8 
Feb-2009  8.2 8.8 7.7 4.7 7.3  10.3 8.7  16.5 8.8 7.4 2.9 4.3 8.8 7.4 7.6 7.1 
Mar-2009  8.5 9.0 8.0 5.2 7.5  11.0 8.7  17.2 9.0 7.4 3.1 4.4 9.1 7.7 8.0 7.2 
Apr-2009  8.7 9.2 8.1 5.7 7.6  11.5  ..  17.6 9.1  .. 3.2 4.3 9.2 8.0 8.4 7.5 
May-2009  8.8 9.3 8.1 5.9 7.7  12.0  ..  17.9 9.3  .. 3.2 4.4 9.3 8.3 8.8 7.6 
Jun-2009  8.9 9.4 8.1 6.2 7.7  12.2  ..  18.1 9.4  .. 3.3 4.4 9.3 8.5 9.0 7.8 




   (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
Jan-2008  6.2 4.6 4.8  10.4 3.8 6.0 4.5 4.3 7.8 6.0 7.9 5.7 
Feb-2008  6.2 4.5 4.7  10.2 3.7 6.2 4.6 4.4 7.6 5.9 7.6 5.7 
Mar-2008  6.0 4.4 4.5  10.0 3.7 6.2 4.5 4.4 7.5 5.8 7.3 5.7 
Apr-2008  5.9 4.3 4.4 9.9 3.6 6.1 4.5 4.7 7.6 5.9 7.3 5.7 
May-2008  5.8 4.3 4.4 9.8 3.5 6.2 4.7 4.8 7.7 6.0 7.2 5.7 
Jun-2008  5.6 4.3 4.4 9.5 3.5 6.4 5.2 4.9 7.8 6.0 7.1 5.7 
Jul-2008  5.5 4.3 4.4 9.2 3.6 6.9 5.8 4.9 7.8 5.9 7.0 5.8 
Aug-2008  5.3 4.3 4.3 9.0 3.5 7.4 6.4 5.0 7.9 5.9 6.9 5.8 
Sep-2008  5.2 4.3 4.1 9.0 3.6 8.1 6.6 5.1 7.9 5.8 6.8 5.8 
Oct-2008  5.1 4.4 4.3 9.0 3.7 9.1 7.2 5.0 7.8 6.0 6.8 5.9 
Nov-2008  5.1 4.5 4.2 9.2 3.8  10.3 8.1 5.2 8.1 6.2 6.9 5.9 
Dec-2008  5.4 4.7 4.3 9.4 4.1  11.4 9.1 5.4 8.4 6.1 7.1 5.9 
Jan-2009  5.6 5.1 4.6 9.7 4.2  12.4  10.1 5.6 8.8 6.4 7.4 6.2 
Feb-2009  6.0 5.5 4.9  10.1 4.4  13.2  11.2 5.8 9.3 6.6 7.8 6.2 
Mar-2009  6.4 5.8 5.3  10.6 4.8  14.2  12.1 6.0 9.7 6.8 8.0 6.2 
Apr-2009  6.5 6.0 5.7  11.0 5.1  15.4  13.0 6.1  10.0 7.0 8.1  : 
May-2009  6.6 6.1 6.0  11.3 5.3  16.4  14.3 6.3  10.2 7.1 8.2  : 
Jun-2009  6.8 6.3 6.1  11.7 5.4  17.1  15.6 6.4  10.3 7.2 8.2  : 
Jul-09  7.0 6.4 6.0  12.0 5.5  17.4  16.7 6.4  10.3 7.3 8.2  : 
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   (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
Jan-2008  4.2 3.8 3.0 4.9 5.8 3.8 2.4 9.0 5.4 6.8 5.6 
Feb-2008  3.9 3.9 3.1 4.8 5.9 3.7 2.4 9.0 5.4 6.8 5.6 
Mar-2008  4.0 3.8 3.1 5.1 6.1 3.7 2.3 9.0 5.5 6.8 5.7 
Apr-2008  4.2 4.0 3.2 5.0 6.0 3.7 2.4 9.0 5.5 6.8 5.7 
May-2008  4.2 4.0 3.2 5.5 6.1 3.7 2.5 9.0 5.7 6.9 5.9 
Jun-2008  4.2 4.1 3.2 5.6 6.2 3.8 2.5 9.0 5.8 6.9 5.9 
Jul-2008  4.3 4.0 3.2 5.8 6.1 3.8 2.4 9.9 5.9 7.1 6.0 
Aug-2008  4.1 4.1 3.2 6.2 6.2 3.9 2.4 9.9 6.1 7.1 6.2 
Sep-2008  4.3 4.0 3.2 6.2 6.2 4.0 2.5 9.9 6.1 7.2 6.2 
Oct-2008  4.4 3.8 3.1 6.6 6.3 4.0 2.7  11.2 6.2 7.5 6.4 
Nov-2008  4.5 4.0 3.2 6.8 6.4 4.8 2.8  11.2 6.4 7.6 6.6 
Dec-2008  4.6 4.3 3.3 7.2 6.6 4.8 2.9  11.2 6.7 7.7 6.8 
Jan-2009  4.9 4.1 3.3 7.6 7.2 4.7 3.0  12.5 6.9 8.2 7.2 
Feb-2009  5.3 4.4 3.5 8.1 7.7 5.0 3.1  12.5 7.2 8.4 7.5 
Mar-2009  5.7 4.8 3.7 8.5 8.0 4.6 3.2  12.5 7.6 8.7 7.8 
Apr-2009  5.5 5.0 3.7 8.9 8.0 5.4 3.1  .. 7.8 8.8 8.0 
May-2009  5.7 5.2 3.9 9.4 8.4 6.1  ..  .. 8.1 8.9 8.3 
Jun-2009  5.8 5.4 4.0 9.5 8.6 5.6  ..  .. 8.2 8.9 8.3 
Jul-2009  5.8 ..  ..  9.4  8.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
 
Notes.  Countries are as follows 
1 European Union  11. Netherlands  21. Cyprus  31. Korea 
2. Euro area  12. Austria  22. Latvia  32. USA 
3. Belgium  13. Portugal  23. Lithuania  33. Canada 
4. Denmark  14. Finland  24. Luxembourg  34. Mexico 
5. Germany  15. Sweden  25. Hungary  35. Norway 
6. Ireland  16. United Kingdom  26. Malta  36. Turkey 
7. Greece  17. Bulgaria  27. Poland  37. G7 
8. Spain  18. Czech Republic  28. Romania  38. OECD Europe 
9. France  19. SIovenia  29. Australia  39. OECD 
10. Italy  20. Slovak Republic  30. Japan
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Figure 3: Timing the Recession - USA 
 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and Standard & Poors Figure 4: Timing the Recession – Germany 
 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators 
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 Figure 5.  Timing the recession – France 
 




Figure 6. Timing the recession - UK 
   Figure 7.  How do you expect unemployment to increase over the next 12 months? - EU 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Jan-85
Jan-86
Jan-87
Jan-88
Jan-89
Jan-90
Jan-91
Jan-92
Jan-93
Jan-94
Jan-95
Jan-96
Jan-97
Jan-98
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
Jan-09
Date
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
50 
 